The Katrina disaster report Congress is reading

Members of Congress have been studying a report titled New Orleans Levees and Floodwalls: Hurricane Damage Protection. We should also study the report because it will influence the congressional commission to investigate the federal response to Katrina -- whenever Democrat and Republican representatives finish staking out territory and get around to forming a commission.

The six-page report was issued September 6 by "CRS," which is so well known on the Hill that the author didn't bother to spell out the acronym. The report simply states, "CRS Report to Congress."

So before turning to the report, here's an introduction to the history and mission of The Congressional Research Service, which is the public policy research arm of the United States Congress.

As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS works exclusively and directly for Members of Congress, their Committees and staff on a confidential, nonpartisan basis. From the CRS website:

History and Mission
Congress created CRS in order to have its own source of nonpartisan, objective analysis and research on all legislative issues. Indeed, the sole mission of CRS is to serve the United States Congress. CRS has been carrying out this mission since 1914, when it was first established as the Legislative Reference Service. Renamed the Congressional Research Service by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, CRS is committed to providing the Congress, throughout the legislative process, comprehensive and reliable analysis, research and information services that are timely, objective, nonpartisan, and confidential, thereby contributing to an informed national legislature.

Because CRS does not make their reports directly available to the public, we can thank the Federation of American Scientists for sharing their copy.

Because federal projects boil down to the bottom line, the CRS report goes into some detail about relevant projects underway prior to the storm. The author also summarizes available knowledge at the time of writing about the major damage to the flood control system:

Challenge of New Orleans Hurricane Protection.
Protecting New Orleans has been an increasingly difficult task. First, the city has become increasingly vulnerable. Land in the city has subsided; barrier islands and wetlands buffering coastal Louisiana have been disappearing; and sea levels have risen.

According to the Corps [of Engineers]...the breaches were at floodwalls along three canals. The 17th Street Canal breach was at a levee-floodwall combination; the breach reached 450 feet in length. According to the Corps, “it’s believed that the force of the water overtopped the floodwall and scoured the structure from behind and then moved the levee wall horizontally.”

The Industrial Canal floodwall had two breaches -- a 100-foot breach, and a 500-foot breach. The London Street floodwall had a 300-foot breach. The Corps continues to work on repairing the breaches.

The Corps noted that other levees and floodwalls were being monitored for potential failure. One reason to fear additional failures is that levees and floodwalls are not designed for extended retention of water, but are instead designed for short-term storm events. [...]

After all these years Pundita still refuses to give away the ending of The Usual Suspects; this by way of explaining that I hate to be a spoilsport. I'll make an exception in this case and leap to the last paragraph:

In what is the understatement of the century thus far, the author notes that "Hurricane Katrina has resulted in some questioning why a Category 4 or 5 hurricane storm damage system was not already in place for New Orleans, and whether it should be part of the rebuilding effort," then settles down to plopping out the brass tacks:

Others are supporting more emphasis on restoration of coastal wetlands to improve storm damage protection. Others are raising concerns about the extent of rebuilding that should take place considering the city’s hurricane and flooding vulnerability. They are concerned that higher levees and floodwalls may provide a false sense of security and continued risk of catastrophic failure. Decisions on what type and level of hurricane protection to provide New Orleans and other coastal areas in the future, as well as factors contributing to Katrina’s damages (Category 3 infrastructure, and levee and floodwall construction, maintenance, and appropriations) likely will be the subject of congressional oversight.

Now how do those last sentences read when translated into plain English? Pundita's blindfolded shot in the dark:

The lowest-lying sections of New Orleans have not been fit for human habitation for well-nigh a century, if ever. So we might as well bow to Nature and deepen and widen the NOLA port to make it fit for containerized shipping, and greatly expand the airport and feeder roads to handle increased cargo traffic from a containerized port. Take that, Singapore!

CRS Report to Congress in PDF. Or copy and past the URL:

http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/RS22238.pdf