The Battle of Iraq, and what is Senator Lugar thinking?

Bill Roggio at The Fourth Rail has the latest update on Operation Phantom Thunder:

Iraqi and Coalition forces maintain the pressure against al Qaeda, Sunni insurgents, and the "rogue," Iranian backed "secret cells" of the Mahdi Army and the Qazali network. Operation Phantom Thunder is underway inside Baghdad and the Belts, as well as against al Qaeda's network nationwide. Also, the northwestern region of Iraq has been a focus of U.S. and Iraqi operations. The simultaneous operations to pressure al Qaeda's network are occurring in all theaters throughout Iraq. An update on each theater is provided below.

Bill has an interesting note about Mookie:

"Sadr's past two demonstrations failed to draw more than ten thousand protesters, when in the past he would draw hundreds of thousands."

As you can see from Bill's rundown on each theater of operation, Coalition and Iraqi forces are making good progress on all fronts. So I find it inexplicable that just as Operation Phantom Thunder geared up, Senator Lugar and other influential GOP congressionals decided that now was the best time to call for the US to quit Iraq.

Yesterday the New York Sun's Eli Lake reported:

The architects of the current surge strategy for Iraq are worried the Republican Party may abandon the war in September and force President Bush to begin the withdrawal of troops from the country prematurely.

Both American Enterprise Institute scholar Frederick Kagan and a retired general, John Keane, the two men who persuaded Mr. Bush to launch the current counteroffensive in Iraq last December, said in interviews this week that they fear Republicans in Congress could be looking to declare victory and leave.

"The tragedy of these efforts is we are on the cusp of potentially being successful in the next year in a way that we have failed in the three-plus preceding years, but because of this political pressure, it looks like we intend to pull out the rug from underneath that potential success," General Keane said [on June 26].

The concerns are real. In the Senate there are anywhere from 10 to 15 Republicans who have signaled publicly and privately they could not support the current surge of troops come September, when Congress is set to vote on another temporary funding bill for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. At that time, General David Petraeus, the top American officer in Iraq, will give a status report on the current strategy. Those Republicans could create a veto-proof two-thirds majority in the Senate, assuming all Democrats vote for a hard withdrawal deadline or threaten to cut off funds.

Okay; I understand the reasoning come September. I even understand that GOP leaders believe the GOP will be routed if they keep supporting the Iraq war in the face of high US poll numbers against the US staying on Iraq.

What I don't understand is the timing of Lugar's remarks. What in God's name is he thinking? Has he totally let go of the concept of war, as if by wishing one can undo the fact that the United States is at war?

Why clearly signal to the enemy that there is no suspense about the outcome in September? Why come right out at this time and tell the enemy that if he can hang on in Iraq through the summer, he will definitely achieve victory?

Thank you, Prime Minister Blair and good luck, Prime Minister Brown

Thank you, Mr Blair, for your help in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack on the United States. Thank you for your unshakable support of the US-led invasion of Iraq. Thank you for your intelligence, and eloquence and courage on the world stage. Best of luck in your new endeavors.

* * * * * * * * *
According to the Guardian, Mr Blair's job as envoy for the Quartet

will deal primarily with helping the Palestinian Authority to build political institutions, and will not - at least at first - involve direct mediation or negotiation between the Palestinians and Israel, US sources said.

His responsibilities could include trying to persuade the Palestinians to accept the conditions for ending the international boycott of Hamas.Diplomats familiar with the proposed mandate for Mr Blair said it did not differ in substance from that of his predecessor, James Wolfensohn, who left the job in April 2006.

Mr Wolfensohn worked on issues such as galvanising international economic assistance to the Palestinians, economic development, governance, justice and human rights.

Mr Blair has repeatedly said the Middle East peace talks need to be micro-managed in the way that he handled the Northern Ireland peace process.

Pundita's nightmare scenario is that Hilary Benn will be the Foreign Secretary under Gordon Brown. However, in the early days of his administration, at least, Mr Brown doesn't seem likely to make radical shifts in UK foreign policy. Here's a rundown by the Beeb's world affairs correspondent, Paul Reynolds:

GENERAL APPROACH
Gordon Brown is something of an unknown quantity as far as foreign policy is concerned. He can probably be described as an Atlanticist and his pro-American sympathies should not be underestimated, though he will not be as close to President Bush as Tony Blair has been. His European instincts incline towards the practical not the integrationist. He has quietly supported all the interventions carried out by the Blair-led government - Iraq, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan - but the question remains as to how far he would undertake such interventions himself. As chancellor of the exchequer (finance minister) he has been keen on multinational initiatives on debt and aid, so he is expected to continue with these.

RELATIONS WITH AMERICA
The expectation is that he will distance himself from President Bush to some degree. However, Mr Brown has close ties to the United States, is certainly not personally anti-American and his will not be an anti-American government. He is interested in and in sympathy with US politics and history, knows a number of American political, especially Democratic, leaders well and holidays at Cape Cod. He might disappoint those who want Britain to make a decisive break with the Bush administration. A lot will depend on the decisions he takes over Iraq.

IRAQ
He has not backed away from the decision to invade Iraq, but has hinted he will take a new look at how long the troops might stay. He said recently: "I take my responsibility as a member of the Cabinet for the collective decisions that we made, and I believe they were the right decisions, but we're at a new stage now." Current British policy is to regroup the 5,500 troops there into one base, at the airport, this summer but there is no timetable for a total withdrawal. Mr Blair has always insisted that the troops will have to stay until conditions for stability are right. Mr Brown, however, has room to manoeuvre because he could interpret those conditions more flexibly. This could be the test of how far he is prepared to diverge from US policy. His own military advisers might also tell him to get out as quickly as possible, perhaps within a year, to avoid army overstretch.

AFGHANISTAN
As British policy in Iraq moves towards an endgame, British military commitments in the war against the Taleban in Afghanistan are increasing and troop numbers are expected to reach nearly 8,000 later this year. Mr Brown is not expected to change this commitment. He has taken a tough stand in the fight against al-Qaeda and believes that it must not be allowed to regroup in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan could become a growing problem for him.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
It would be wrong to suppose that Mr Brown will weaken Britain's efforts. Indeed, he has recently proposed tougher laws domestically, signalling that he thinks domestic and international Islamist terrorism remains a serious threat. As chancellor, he has acted against sources of terrorist funding. In a speech in 2006 he declared his intentions: "This global terrorist problem must be fought globally - with all the means at our disposal: military, security, intelligence, economic and culture."

IRAN
Mr Brown can be expected to continue supporting UN sanctions against Iran over its nuclear activities. Asked recently if he would rule out a military attack on Iran he replied: "We want a peaceful settlement to the Iran issue." This is in line with current British government policy, which emphasises a multilateral approach but does not rule out military action. However, one of Mr Brown's closest political allies, the former foreign secretary Jack Straw, has said: "I don't happen to believe that military action has a role to play in any event. We could not justify it." So support by Mr Brown for military action is hard to envisage.

MIDDLE EAST
Gordon Brown has not shown as much interest in Israel/Palestine issues as Tony Blair has. Britain therefore is not expected to play a major role under a Brown premiership, which will probably recognise the limited influence that any single European country can exert. The appointment of Simon McDonald, a former British ambassador to Israel, as his foreign policy adviser has delighted the Israelis, who see McDonald as "friend of Israel". One of Mr Brown's main areas of interest could be in economic development for the Palestinians. On a visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories in 2005, he got Israeli and Palestinian economic ministers together for the first time in many years.

SUDAN/ZIMBABWE
He is likely to support increased sanctions against Sudan in the Security Council over Darfur and might face a tough decision at some stage on whether to provide military forces to enforce a no-fly zone over Darfur, if this is agreed by the Security Council. Zimbabwe might present problems if the situation deteriorates further but Brown's instinct will be to work through neighbouring countries to bring pressure on Robert Mugabe while standing ready to help with aid.

EUROPEAN UNION
The main issues over the EU treaty were settled at the Brussels summit, but the new prime minister will have to approve the final details. As chancellor, Gordon Brown has been more interested in practical EU policies than in institutional debates. He sees Britain's future in an EU that is flexible, free-market and pragmatic. A study in the journal International Affairs in March concluded that he would be either an "awkward partner" or a "pragmatic player" but not someone who wanted to put Britain at the forefront of European integration. His EU adviser is a Treasury official, John Cunliffe, who knows Mr Brown's thinking on Europe well. Mr Brown has kept Britain out of the Euro and this policy is likely to continue. Arguments ahead could come over Turkish membership, which he wants, state support for industry which the new French President Nicolas Sarkozy favours, farm policy reform and Britain's budget contributions.

CLIMATE CHANGE
Mr Brown commissioned and accepted the results of the report on climate change by Sir Nicholas Stern in October 2006, which said that global warming could shrink the world economy's potential by between 5 and 20%. He has supported EU and British targets for carbon reductions. So he is on board for international action over climate change, which has come increasingly to dominate world economic discussions. In March 2007 he said: "The foundation of this must of course be a new international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions beyond 2012." He added: "My ambition is to build a global carbon market, founded on the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and centred in London." He has even appointed the former US Vice President Al Gore as an adviser and action on global warming is another issue on which he is likely to differ from President Bush.

AID AND DEVELOPMENT
This was one area in which Gordon Brown made his mark internationally as chancellor. He has championed debt relief through the "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries" initiative. He proposed an International Finance Facility to help the poorer countries to raise capital. He supported the G8 initiative in 2005 to double aid to Africa. The UK Treasury says he will have increased the British aid budget to "nearly £6.5 billion a year by 2007-08 - a real terms increase of 140 per cent since 1997". So he can be expected to be active in these areas as prime minister. His efforts will probably be reflected in an attempt to get Britain closer to the Commonwealth.

Middle East: a change in the weather

Last week saw stunning events in the Middle East:

Moqtada al Sadr accused Iran of being in collaboration with al Qaeda. And Tawfiq al Tirawi, the Palestinian intelligence chief, accused Iran of playing a "big role" in Hamas's seizure of Gaza.

The accusations are notable for their specificity; earlier Mahmoud Abbas had vaguely accused "foreign elements from the region" of orchestrating Hamas's takeover of Gaza, and Mookie had taken vague pot shots at what he termed Iran's interference in Iraqi affairs.

It could be that Mookie's earlier accusation was a tactic to assure fellow Iraqis that he was not under the thumb of his Iranian masters. Whatever his motive, his directly connecting Iran with al Qaeda in Iraq is a very serious accusation in light of the 'blame al Qaeda' sentiment sweeping Iraq society.

Another stunner has been Iran's weak response to al Tirawi's accusation; Mohammad Ali Hosseini, Iran's foreign ministry spokesman, said it was "surprising some Arab countries ignore the Western countries, the United States and the Zionist regime."

No one outside Iran is buying that shopworn excuse. Iran's warfare against peaceful governments in the Middle East is now plainly visible.

On June 22 Bill Roggio reported on more stunning news from the Middle East: the success of the first week of Operation Phantom Thunder, the corps-coordinated operation across three theaters in the Baghdad Belts.

It's as if the Coalition has corrected every mistake they made during the past four years of fighting in Iraq. Gone is what John McCain called the "Whack-a-Mole strategy" -- the Coalition chasing the insurgency out of one Iraq region but leaving the region when things quieted down, which meant the insurgents quickly returned.

And the Coalition has ditched another aspect of Whack-a-Mole; they're now picking off the enemy as he attempts to flee a fight or hotly pursing him if he gets past the booby traps, instead of allowing him to flee as in the Battle of Fallujah.

What makes the early gains of Operation Phantom Thunder particularly interesting is that the operation converges with anti-al Qaeda sentiment among Iraqis. The confluence paints a stark picture for al Qaeda in Iraq. Bill Roggio comments in the same report:

Al Qaeda is left with fewer places to hide: Anbar Province no longer a safe haven, pressure has increased Baghdad and the hot operations in the belts, and the Shia south is hostile. Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Salahadin, remain as al Qaeda's fall back positions, but Iraqi and U.S. Forces have prepared for this option. Some of the best Iraqi Army units are stationed in the northwest.[...]

Of course al Qaeda has responded with their "patented" suicide bombing attacks against civilians. But the attacks only stiffen the resolve of Iraqis and further expose al Qaeda's blatant attempts to foment civil strife.

Inside the Box: More on the US in Iraq

Dave Schuler at The Glittering Eye has rounded up some recent mainstream opinion on the Iraq situation, and below is his take on my Three Kings post, and my reply.

Dear Pundita:
There have been rumors floating around of a U. S.-backed coup headed by Iyad Allawi for a year now. I think there are several reasons for them.

First, I think that a lot of Iraqis just can't imagine peaceful surrender of power: Allawi couldn't possibly just relinquish power voluntarily; he must be planning a coup.

Second, the Shi'a in particular tend to completely conflate Sunnis and Ba'athists. I don't know that they're wrong. They think that the Ba'athists, e.g., Allawi, will do anything to regain power. Hence, a coup.

Third, they may be right. Who knows?

[Regarding your observation about the US muddling through in Iraq], I'm reminded of a comment by the late Mayor Daley (in response to charges that the Chicago police had provoked a riot (or rioted themselves) at the Democratic Convention in 1968:

"The Chicago police were not there to create disorder. The Chicago police were there to PRESERVE disorder."
Dave Schuler

Dear Dave:
I got a laugh from your Mayor Daley story; the quote is vintage Daley!

I think I've observed once before that best metaphor for the US in Iraq is the heroine in the movie Cold Comfort Farm; the relatives she helps are a perfect metaphor for the majority of Iraqis.

I daresay no one from an advanced nation who has worked in development in third world countries can watch Cold Comfort Farm without collapsing in laughter mixed with tears of frustration and understanding.

My dear Dave, the world is full of very stubborn and proud people who are very set in their ways, and whose way of life is so overgrown with moss that it's intolerable, even for them. They know they have to change, but that means giving up a way of life they're used to. And it means dealing with their fear that the earth will open up and swallow them in vengeance, if do abandon the old ways.

What wins in that situation? If you cast out the inhumane approaches to modernizing views, of the kind that Mao deployed, you're left with the tactics of tenacity and patience. You just have to hang in there and repeat the same points, over and over and over -- without losing your temper or acting superior.

It's a fair argument that the heroine of Cold Comfort Farm didn't have to shed blood in order to help her relatives join the modern era. Yet it's also fair to argue that when the Coalition toppled Saddam Hussein's government, we ripped the lid off Pandora's Box. We were horrified when we learned what was inside the box.

Senator Gordon Smith recently recounted that Muslim Iraqi police cadets stoned to death their Iraqi training officer because they found out he was a Catholic.

There is the common practice of intermarriage between first cousins. Brain damage and all kinds of birth defects are rampant in the region because of the practice. Polygamy is rampant, even though most families can't support many children.

One horror after another -- horrors that should have been left behind when the modern era came. Yet generations of Europeans and Americans who dealt with those peoples turned a blind eye.

Piled on top of all that grief was the UN embargo and Saddam's abuse of the Oil for Food Program, which was responsible for hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths.

An entire population was being killed off -- not by a planned genocide or the throes of war but through cruelty, ignorance, and criminal neglect.

I realize I'm skating near the Nurture vs. Nature argument, but these are fellow humans. So who among us is willing to say that maybe it's best that the most backward among us die off? We can't say that -- and even wanted to, there is the bogeyman to contend with. Al Qaeda will not allow us to let things be, to turn a blind eye.

So we are left in the position of the very modern heroine in Cold Comfort Farm -- and with the warning that Prince Bandar gave President Bush when Bandar learned that Bush wanted to invade Iraq: Just remember you're buying the farm.

And everything inside the box.

US in Iraq: Three Kings All

James Cogan, writing for the World Socialist Web Site, has a revealing analysis of where things stand regarding the Iraq government's efforts to meet US benchmarks for political progress in Iraq.

[...] Maliki has been unable to secure agreement from the various factions in the Iraqi parliament on any of the key US demands. Essentially, the US is demanding that Shiite and Kurdish parties agree to the erosion of their recently acquired power and privileges. Thus far, they have shown no signs of doing so. No legislation that meets the US benchmarks is even under consideration. [...]

The intransigence of Shiite and Kurdish opposition to the US demands is fueling a pervasive sense of crisis within both the Bush administration and the US military.

In order to curb the insurgency, US commanders have been given the go ahead to negotiate truces with Sunni insurgents behind the back of Maliki’s government. Sunni tribal heads have been given control of the western province of Anbar in exchange for calling off armed resistance. Efforts are underway to convince insurgents in the largely Sunni provinces of Salah Ad Din and Diyala to accept a similar arrangement.

Shiite politicians are objecting to a US policy that effectively places entire swathes of the country into the hands of their bitter enemies.

An unnamed official of Maliki’s government told the Washington Post: “They are forcing the Iraqi government and the Shia and the Kurds to reconcile with the Saddamists.”

Maliki has reportedly ordered the Iraqi military to treat the Sunni militia, with which US troops are arming and conducting joint patrols, as “outlaws”.

For the Bush administration, the situation is becoming untenable. It cannot achieve what it wants through the Maliki government, but there is no political alternative within the Iraqi parliament. Efforts to develop a rival bloc around former interim prime minister Iyad Allawi have thus far come to very little. In such conditions, the US may well consider some form of coup.

I have trouble envisioning a coup, but the analysis suggests the major reason that Iraq's parliament has been talking for months about taking a vacation during July and August. I guess it's their way of saying that since the US considers Maliki's government irrelevant anyhow, why go through the motions in the runup to the US military's September progress report to Congress?

Take the vacation; this will give more time for Saudi King "I am not Bush's Arab Tony Blair" Abdullah to flog the Gold Dinar Fairy to even greater activity in Iraq. If not a coup, maybe we'll see a stronger Allawi-led coalition emerge by the time the parliament returns from vacation.

Meanwhile, al Qaeda continues their historical pattern of wearing out their welcome everywhere they go. Al Qaeda's footprint was again evident in the bombing of the Shiite Golden Dome mosque in Samarra. But this second time, and despite a seeming 'revenge 'bombing of a Sunni mosque and Mookie's call to Shiites for a "peaceful" march to the Golden Dome in July, the Iraqis weren't provoked into a sectarian bloodbath.

Ayad Jamaludeen, a Shiite cleric and member of parliament from the secular Iraqiya party, said Iraqis are sick of violence and tired of being used as pawns by al Qaeda in Iraq.

"Al Qaeda cannot live except in a situation where there is sectarian tension and crisis," he said. "The Iraqis have understood this and now recognize who the enemy is."(1)

This is a lesson that every government and sectarian faction involved with al Qaeda has learned the hard way. Al Qaeda is the bogeyman for our era: Eat your vegetables, don't fall into clan warfare, have a strong central government that reflects the will of the people -- or al Qaeda will move in on your country and sow more grief than you can imagine.

So how are things stacking up for the US effort in Iraq? The shorter the timeline used as a yardstick, the worse things look. But considering where the people of that region were a thousand years ago; and considering centuries of machinations by Arab satraps and European colonialists, and European and US meddling in the last century; and considering Saddam's rule; and the UN embargo of Iraq -- we're muddling through.

We could muddle a lot better, but to say we're presiding over a disaster we created is to ignore the scope of disaster that existed in Iraq before the US-led invasion. It was just that the disaster didn't make headlines or cost Coalition blood; it was a disaster papered over by neglect from the world outside Iraq.

Last week I saw the movie Three Kings for the first time. The movie harks back to The Gulf War. A group of US soldiers steal gold that Saddam stole during his invasion of Kuwait. But they get involved in the plight of some Iraqi Shiites, whose doomed uprising against the government brings Saddam's wrath. The soldiers finally give up the gold in exchange for getting the Iraqis to safety in Iran. Then the soldiers leave Iraq and its troubles.

So here we are today, Three Kings all, trying to finish what Bush 41 started. Recalling that the Shiite uprising was inspired by US encouragement, the narrow view is that the lesson for the US is never encourage other peoples to rise up against a brutal regime. But now there is the bogeyman to keep us struggling on the right side of justice.

1) From As Sunni Mosque Falls, Sadr Issues a Call by John Ward Anderson and K.I. Ibrahim, The Washington Post, June 17, 2007.

Well, so much for the Saudi plan.

King Abdullah knew better than Washington so he brokered a Hamas-Fatah "unity" Palestinian government. Now what, your magnificence?

There will be a post on Monday sometime before noon.

Regards to all,
Pundita

High intrigue

For readers who are still not convinced that the issue of the World Bank presidency isn't terribly important, read on. Keep in mind that World Bank President is the go-to website not only for news surrounding the Wolfowitz Affair but also for World Bank insider intelligence reports on the matter.

The affair is building to a crescendo with rumors flying this afternoon that Wolfy is throwing in the towel; meanwhile the tiger he has for an attorney continues in pouncing mode.

So I have a vision of World Bank board members gathered around a computer with a Hacking for Dummies book propped open under the monitor. But the attack could have come from other factions including Wolfy's camp, or even a media outlet that smells blood in the water and doesn't want Wolfowitz's departure from the Bank to be scooped by a website......

4:08 PM, EDT
"Pundita,
Our website is down. Our hosting company says it's almost certainly a denial of service attack. The pattern of activity is very suspicious.
Best from Britain,
Alex Wilks
World Bank President "

6:36 PM
Dear Alex:
Just opened your email and raced to your site; relieved that it's back up. If it happens a second time, Pundita will set up howl.

6:55 PM
Pundita,
"Thanks v much. We're back as you say and planning to stay that way (took off all graphics, for one thing).
Alex"

Alex,
Re the graphics remark -- so you think it might have been a technical glitch?? Or still suspicious?

"Pundita,
No, still totally suspicious. The attackers were apparently hitting our graphics folder - fastest way to get us off.
Alex"

Alex,
Ah ha! This calls for a Pundita post. The TV set with a question mark is still on your front page; Pundita is very ignorant of such matters but that's a graphic; right?

"Pundita, you're spot on re what is a graphic. But it's weird if you see that right now on your version of our site. I have not seen the TV screen since we came back live. Firefox gives a 'spacer spacer, spacer' notice, with just the word TV. IE gives a placeholder for a graphic but not the graphic. Please refresh your browser.
Alex"

More on State-Pentagon battles, and there's no such thing as diplomatic war

Two interesting takes on Monday's post about the conflict between the Pentagon and State Department regarding the Pentagon's involvement in foreign aid. Dan Riehl focused on the possibility of Newt Gingrich positioning himself for a run at the US presidency, which I hadn't considered.

Yet I remain mystified as to why Newt is coming down on State's side in the Pentagon-State conflict. I seem to recall that in the early years after 9/11, Newt was a vociferous critic of State. Does he think he can score points with Condoleezza Rice by turning on the Pentagon?

In any case, Newt's argument for civilian-led foreign aid in conflict situations is not only unrealistic, it also overlooks the vast power that State's unelected bureaucrats have gained. The Pentagon is perhaps the only effective counterweight, given that State's operations are virtually immune from congressional oversight and can be greatly resistant to White House policies.

John Loftus also weighed in:

"Pundita:
I recall that in postwar Germany and Japan the [U.S.] military had a traditional political function, G-5, and was in charge of administering occupied areas. State supplied a political adviser (Polad) but was kept out of the chain of command. Even the High Commissioner of Germany (HICOG) was usually a retired general.

Unfortunately, Colin Powell changed the status quo; State led the post-war administration in Iraq with disastrous results. Barbara Bodine was actually the mayor of Baghdad!

If it is only a question of competence, I think the military should take the lead role every time.
John Loftus "

Dear John:
Whenever I hear of Barbara Bodine I remember John O'Neill's attempts to investigate the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and Bodine's intervention on behalf of the Yemen government. The incident illustrates the severe case of Clientitis that befell State starting in the 1980s.

The US invasion of Iraq had such a big public relations angle; it was a 'diplomatic war' (a contradiction in terms). Officially, the US never 'occupied' Iraq and so couldn't carry out the kind of actions that led to successful stabilization and reconstruction of Japan and Germany. Yet those actions are the only intelligent ones when an invading force has toppled a government and found the country and political parties in ruins.

I was horrified by the argument that Paul Bremer used to insist that Iraq's state-run factories remain shut. Bremer wanted private investors to buy the factories! Of course the investors never showed up. He was making an economics argument in a situation that screamed for post-conflict stabilization measures by a military.

I note that one part of the Pentagon-State war seems to be going the Pentagon's way, but not before a pitched battle occurred:

Paul Brinkley, a deputy undersecretary of defense, has been called a Stalinist by U.S. diplomats in Iraq. One has accused him of helping insurgents build better bombs. The State Department has even taken the unusual step of enlisting the CIA to dispute the validity of Brinkley's work.

His transgression? To begin reopening dozens of government-owned factories in Iraq. [...](1)

1) Defense Skirts State in Reviving Iraqi Industry by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, May 14, The Washington Post.

Weakening US defense of Wolfowitz?

Alex Wilks at World Bank President reports this morning on telling language that may signal the White House is withdrawing support for Wolfy:

The Bush administration seems to be shifting strategy in the face of mounting opposition to Paul D. Wolfowitz. On ABC News a White House official told ABC's Jonathan Karl that 'all options are on the table' regarding world bank president Paul Wolfowitz, and 'it is an open question' whether he should remain as president of world bank.

Read more.

Ah, Mr Wolfowitz, you overlooked World Bank Staff Rule number 500,051.2, Paragraph 613

"Pundita, dear, it seems you got your wish. Paul Wolfowitz hasn't yet chained himself to his desk but he has been fighting to stay at the Bank, as you advised. I notice that after launching a series of volleys, you have been very quiet about Affaire Wolfie. Are you too busy jabbing pins into an effigy of Hilary Benn to comment on the drama or offer more advice?
Boris in Jackson Heights"

Dear Boris:
Visit Dan Riehl's blog for links, if you want to keep up with the latest well-meaning but naive impassioned defenses of Wolfy from various US media sources. And drop by World Bank President blog for all the news, analysis, speculation and delicious insider gossip about the Battle of the Bank.

I seem to recall writing an essay in 2005 that was titled "Courtiers and Indentured Servants" or something like that, in which I tried to convey a little of the world inside the World Bank. Yet the Bank is impossible for outsiders to comprehend unless they are steeped in the history of large imperial courts in Byzantine times.

The Bank evolved into a Byzantine organization. This is due to an extraordinary convergence of factors; among them, the Bank's international charter and peculiar status as a quasi-bureaucratic for-profit bank that must answer to many governments and, in many respects, to another quasi-bureaucratic transnational organization -- the International Monetary Fund.

So to see the Bank as merely a bureaucratic organization is to miss by a mile. The Bank's way of doing things is a throwback to a time that no longer exists. It reminds me of the plot of Jurassic Park; something that died out but was resurrected due to human meddling.

Here I can imagine several readers rolling their eyes in impatience. I am not taking you through all this so you can understand Wolfowitz's situation or even the Bank. I am continuing my quest to discern the outlines of the 21st Century for American foreign policy.

Yesterday Sebastian Mallaby penned a dizzy defense of the World Bank but in the course of which he highlighted a growing trend among powerful governments that is little understood by Americans -- and indeed by most people the world over. In arguing for the Bank's continued existence, Mallaby wrote:

Private investors tend not to finance global public goods -- projects that are important for the world but not a priority for any one country.

You might want to read the sentence a few times for the full import to sink in but I'll continue with the quote:

The world needs to cut carbon emissions, for example, but an individual country won't capture all the benefits of a clean coal plant, since these benefits are shared globally. Because of this "externality" problem, there is a role for the World Bank in subsidizing anti-carbon policies.(1)

Mr Mallaby is saying that the development needs of sovereign nations are not necessarily in synch with initiatives that the most powerful nations deem good for the world. This argument has been gaining steam for more than a decade in the European Union and the United Nations.

Implementing the argument has not been successful. Thus, the World Bank is now seen by governments that want to globalize certain initiatives as one means to integrate the response of developing nations to "external" issues, whether or not the nations can afford "global good" projects.

This use for the World Bank is a long, long way from the Bank's charter and intention, which is to service sovereign nations. Yet when you clear away all the smoke surrounding the attacks wafting from Europe about Wolfowitz's tenure, you find that little fire we can term "redoing the Bank's charter to accommodate global good projects."

So. Americans are not on target when they charge that the Europeans are out to get Wolfy because they want a European to lead the Bank. Honestly and truly, the Europeans who are leading the charge don't care whether someone from Mars is the president. What they want is a president who will pull the Bank in the direction of projects that are not country specific but which address external needs that the UN deems to be for the greater good.

Leave aside whether or not we agree with the goal; is Wolfowitz capable of managing this kind of transition? Yes and no. There is a litmus test to determine whether a person can get along at the World Bank:

If you can reply, "As you wish" to a directive without giving away in the memo, or to those in earshot, what you intend to imply by the remark, you are qualified to work at the Bank.

Paul Wolfowitz flunked the test, as did the Americans he brought into the Bank as his assistants. In 2005 I thought he was doing well at learning Bankese but from all accounts, he learned the lingo in the way a tourist in France speaks French by reading a guidebook of terms. In any case, learning pronunciation is only a part of getting along at the Bank.

The other side of the story is that the people who most want him out of the Bank are studiously overlooking a crucial point: if they want the World Bank to lead in externalizing project benefits, now more than ever there must be a lid on corruption. Why? Because if a government doesn't find the loan to be of immediate value to their country, why should they invest in closely monitoring the Global Good loans?

So Paul Wolfowitz has the right vision but things went horribly wrong at the implementation stage. Maybe he would say that you can't term a rocky path as a failure. My heart is with that argument but in the long run we'll all be dead. If you don't have things moving within a couple years in the business world, you need another approach.

My only advice to Wolfy at this time is to observe that when you don't understand the lay of the land, you can only fall back on playing yourself to the hilt if you insist on staying. Wolfy is very forceful and uncompromising in his approach, which is why I suggested a hunger strike and chaining himself to his desk during his fight to remain World Bank President. While he's subsisting on vitamins and water, he can remember that every day he fights on is another day that news about the World Bank will be on the front page of major newspapers. Which is exactly where discussions of the Bank need to be.

1) Endgame at the World Bank by Sebastian Mallaby, May 14, 2007, The Washington Post.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Newt Gingrich have amnesia about State's record.

Overview: State needs to move over and make more room for Pentagon-led foreign assistance programs.

"The U.S. Department of State is committed to promoting U.S. economic and commercial interests overseas. Secretary Warren Christopher has put the economic security of the American people at the top of our foreign policy priorities."
-- U.S. Department of State, Business Services Office of the Coordinator for Business Affairs, August 1995

May, 2007
The Pentagon is seeking to make permanent and expand to other countries some security and foreign assistance programs underway in Iraq and Afghanistan that traditionally have been supervised by the State Department and the Agency for International Development.

Legislation sent to Capitol Hill -- under the title of Building Global Partnerships Act of 2007 -- would allow the secretary of defense, "with the concurrence of the secretary of state," to spend up to $750 million to help foreign governments build up not only their military forces, but also police and other "security forces" to "combat terrorism and enhance stability." [...]

In February testimony for the House Armed Services Committee, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for an interagency National Security Initiative Fund "to better invest in countering terrorism with other countries."

"We need a dramatic leap forward in our relationship with interagency and international partners," Pace said [...]. Terrorists sometimes "hide in countries with whom we are not at war," he said, adding that in many cases the best way to respond "is by augmenting the capacity of those countries to defeat terrorism and increase stability." [...]

The Pentagon's growing role in foreign assistance has drawn criticism. Last month, former House speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) told a Council on Foreign Relations meeting that "we do not want uniformed military doing what others should be doing." He suggested that State Department funding should grow by 50 percent so ambassadors could lead such projects.

Last December, following an investigation directed by then-Chairman Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported that "as a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs . . . U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps" in public diplomacy and foreign economic assistance. The result "risks weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries," the report said.(1)

For almost a decade running up to September 11, 2001, the US Department of State did indeed set the agenda for US relations with foreign countries, even though that was supposed to be the job of the White House and Congress. The resulting debacle for US security became evident to the public only in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack.

As the dust from the attack settled it became clear that under State's watch, every region on earth except Europe, and every trouble spot with the exception of the Israel-Palestinian dispute and North Korea, had been ignored by US foreign policy except with regard to business deals.

One might argue that State was only carrying out the policy of the Clinton administration, which gave top priority to expanding US trade and servicing ex-Soviet states that were candidates for European Union membership. But once Clinton left office, State continued with the agenda of placing global business dealings before national security. And State waged an aggressive campaign against President Bush when he made US security the top priority for US foreign relations.

Newt Gingrich and the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee know all this, so I can only speculate on the cause of their collective amnesia. Perhaps it occurred from repeated blows on the head delivered by foreign and domestic business lobbies.

Readers who assume that State got their head screwed on straight under Condoleezza Rice's leadership should recall her recent statement that promoting democracy is the top priority of US foreign policy. No, the top priority is defending the United States; promoting democracy in the world is just one component of defense strategy.

It's not much help if State gets pried away from their "Global Business Rules" mindset only to wander in the thicket of promoting democracy as the top priority for the US government's security agenda.

State cannot admit to the real priority because doing so offends numerous business interests here and abroad, and takes some power away from State and gives it to the Pentagon. State is still operating according to the view that US defense and intelligence agencies should be under the authority of the foreign office's diplomacy.

Yet much of the world is a pastiche of weak governments under pressure from armed groups with ties to crime syndicates and terrorist organizations that operate across borders. Such a world can't be ministered to only through State's diplomacy and USAID grants. Ethiopia's lessons in Somalia underscore the way things really are:

"Get it done quickly and get out." That, says a senior U.S. diplomat here, was the goal of the little-noticed war that Ethiopia has been fighting, with American support, against Islamic extremists in Somalia. But this in-and-out strategy encounters the same real-world obstacles that America is facing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Conflict is less the problem than what comes after it. That's the dilemma that America and its allies are discovering in a world where war-fighting and nation-building have become perversely mixed.

It took the Ethiopians just a week to drive a Muslim radical movement known as the Islamic Courts from Mogadishu in December. The hard part wasn't chasing the enemy from the capital but putting the country back together. [...]

"The Ethiopians are looking for an opportunity to exit, but not until they are confident that the security environment will prevent a return to chaos," says a State Department official who helps oversee policy for the region.

And in Somalia, a backward country that has had 14 governments since 1991, that process of stabilization will be anything but easy. [...]

The Ethiopians have now concluded that they can't withdraw completely anytime soon; they must instead stay and train a friendly Somali army that can support the pro-Ethiopian "Transitional Federal Government." [...]

In 2002, Centcom established a regional outpost in the dusty port city of Djibouti, at the entrance to the Red Sea. It now has about 1,500 U.S. military personnel. Some of them are out digging wells, building schools, vaccinating goats and otherwise "waging peace," as a spokesman there explains. That's the nation-building side.

The Djibouti base also provides logistical support for U.S. Special Forces teams that are hunting down what's left of the al-Qaeda terrorist cells that bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. [...](2)

Readers who want insights about State's course during the decade running up to 9/11 should read Joel Mowbray's Dangerous Diplomacy. They might also read, or re-read, Pundita's 2004 post The America Desk at State: The Office for Commercial and Business Affairs, which helps explain why State was so willfully blind to the gathering threats in the 1990s.

1) Pentagon Hopes to Expand Aid Program

2) Ethiopia's Iraq

Samuelson's wrong assessment of China's predatory trade practice

Readers who have been with this blog for years know that Pundita wouldn't hesitate to blame the Chinese for anything. Yet I find myself at odds with Robert J. Samuelson's analysis of why China's trade practices can be termed "predatory."

China is already the world's third-largest trading nation and seems destined to become the largest. On its present course, it threatens to wreck the entire post-World War II trading system. Constructed largely by the United States, that system has flourished because its benefits are widely shared. Since 1950, global trade has expanded by a factor of 25. By contrast, China's trade is mercantilist: It's designed to benefit China even if it harms its trading partners.

[...] For China to expand production, demand must come from its own consumers or other nations -- or some other country's production must be displaced. [...] As China moves up the technology chain, it may become the low-cost export platform for more and more industries. This could divert production from the rest of Asia, Europe, Latin America and the United States.

It is not "protectionist" (I am a long-standing free-trader) to complain about policies that are predatory; China's are just that. The logic of free trade is that comparative advantage ultimately benefits everyone. Countries specialize in what they do best. Production and living standards rise. But the logic does not allow for one country's trade systematically to depress its trading partners' production and employment. Down that path lie resentment and political backlash.

What are the policies Samuelson finds predatory?

> China's refusal to revalue the yuan, which according to a source he quotes may be 40% cheaper than it "should" be. "The resulting competitive advantage props up exports, production and jobs [in China]."

> High Chinese savings rate and their lagging behind the US in consumerism, both of which Samuelson finds irresponsible. "Personal consumption spending is a meager 38 percent of GDP; that's half the U.S. rate of 70 percent."

> China's pesky habit of using their "surplus" personal savings, supplemented by business savings and foreign capital, to fund the construction of factories. "That raises the need to export."

All this conduces to China not being a team player in the global trade arena:

Everyone complains about America's trade deficits, but they actually symbolize global leadership. Access to the U.S. market has promoted trade by enabling other countries to export. But the deficits cannot grow indefinitely. Imagine now a trading system whose largest member seems intent on accumulating permanently large surpluses.

Nor, it might be added, are surpluses ultimately in China's interests. They drain too much of its production from its citizens and contribute to growing domestic economic inequality. What everyone needs is more balanced Chinese economic growth, less dependent on exports.

And Samuelson calls himself a free trader, huh? Since when did the free trade philosophy include accusing a country of social dumping? For that's what Samuelson is complaining about. He seems afraid that Americans will have to dump their standard of living to be competitive with the Chinese.

Samuelson expresses concern for the Chinese and the reasons for their high savings rate. "The Chinese save at astonishingly high levels, partly because they're scared of emergencies. The social safety is skimpy."

Would that more Americans were scared of emergencies, eh? Fewer of us would be heavily in consumer-driven debt. And just think what our captains of industry could do with our savings surplus. Why, we might even hope to compete with the Chinese.

I am happy that Samuelson musters compassion for the plight of Chinese without social benefits such as unemployment insurance, but this has nothing to do with the issue of free trade. Neither do any of his complaints.

Samuelson doesn't strike me as being so much in support of free trade as in support of a way of life for Americans -- a way of life that he wants developing countries to support by being less competitive. He wants the Chinese to alter their behavior so that Americans don't have to alter their behavior and expectations for what the good life entails.

We don't want smelly, polluting industries in our back yards. So ship the industries to China or anywhere but the USA. We don't want to injure so much as a thumbnail while on the job, so send the dangerous jobs and loose safety regulations to China or anywhere but the USA. We don't want unions to choke American industry, so set up union-free industrial plantations in China or anywhere but the USA.

China does engage in a predatory and mercantilist trade practice: the government supports industries that dump on the least developed nations Chinese-made goods sold at below manufacturing cost. And they dump wherever they can get away with it, including the USA.

Why Samuelson does not mention this well-known practice of the Chinese government is beyond me. Yet he has misdirected attention to social dumping issues and currency manipulation. I wish I knew why. A shot in the dark is that he thinks protectionism will result, if the United States and other nations go after the real issue with China's way of doing business.

Bolivarian, Chavista, or Venezuela's version of 1950s USA?

"Pundita:
Have you lost your marbles? I thought you were anti-communist and a big supporter of free market policies. I can understand your reservations about wholesale application of some neoliberal economic remedies to the poorest developing countries, but from your [post of yesterday] it looks to me as if you've gone gaga over Hugo Chavez's ideas. He's a communist, in case you hadn't noticed.
Chicago Dan"

Dear Chicago Dan:
First of all, some clarifications, which don't really speak to your observations. I hurried yesterday's post into publication without proofreading then went back and edited it. Mostly minor edits but for readers who saw the early edition, I mistakenly omitted the site of the seven Venezuelan refineries up for sale; they are in the United States.

Also, I highlighted why I think the Trickle Down theory has had such a hard time working in certain Latin American countries:

"He's saying to put your own country first, then hop around the world. I wouldn't exactly call that an anti-globalist position. I'd call it a refutation of the Trickle Down theory when applied to very poor countries with a very small middle class.

Although Chavez says his revolution aims to create a classless society, he's actually taking actions to rapidly create a large middle class."

And a reader suggested that I substitute "Bolivarian Strategy" for "Southern Strategy" on the arguments that Venezuela is still in the northern hemisphere even though it's in South America, and because "Chavez's strategy is actually called Bolivarian." The reader also disputed that Venezuela should be termed a "very poor" country, given its oil wealth.

Both criticisms are fair; although Chavez's political philosophy is just as often called "Chavismo."

Now for the communist label. Whatever his sympathies in that direction during his youth, I do not think the label sticks to Chavez as Venezuela's leader. Certainly there is a fear that he will bring in communist government, and that was also my initial fear. From all I've seen, I think he's trying whatever will work to correct the obscene economic inequalities in a nation swimming in oil wealth.

Have you seen some of the stats on Venezuela? About 85% of the population live in urban areas yet 32% of Venezuelans lack adequate sanitation. Only 3% of sewage is treated; most major cities in the country lack treatment facilities. Almost 20% of Venezuelans lack access to potable water, one of the highest rates in South America. All that leads to widespread diseases related to raw sewage and impure drinking water. Infant mortality in Venezuela is 19 deaths per 1,000 births, five times higher than that of Sweden. But why? In a country with oil wealth?

Those are unacceptable statistics. The problem with the Trickle Down theory of economics is that the trickles only get down to a certain level, then they get recycled within the ruling class. This situation won't stand, and it always leads to revolutions, which lead to a severe backwash, which leads to a police state, and so on.

I think what Chavez is trying for is roughly a Venezuelan version of the USA in the 1950s, which saw the rise of a large middle class. The middle class was raised on the back of a G.I. education bill, powerful unions, and state-controlled monopolies of key strategic industries. Is that recipe communist? Doesn't the Trickle Down economic remedy work best when applied in a nation with a large middle class?

Maybe you're right, Dan; maybe Chavez has hoodwinked me. But let's take a look at the Wikipedia article on Bolivarianism. The Wiki editors sniff that the article needs more citations but still it's a useful starting point.

Bolivarianism is a set of political doctrines that enjoys currency in parts of South America, especially Venezuela. Bolivarianism is eponymous with Simón Bolívar, the 19th century Venezuelan general and liberator who led the struggle for independence throughout much of South America. One of the main ideals of "Bolivarianism" is promoting the unification of Latin America. The most prominent exponent and architect of modern Bolivarianism is currently Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez.

In recent years, its most significant political manifestation is in the government of Venezuela's president Hugo Chávez, who since the beginning of his presidency has called himself a Bolivarian patriot and applied his interpretation of several of Bolívar's ideals to everyday affairs, as part of the Bolivarian Revolution. That included the 1999 Constitution, which changed Venezuela's name to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and other ideas such as the Bolivarian Schools, Bolivarian Circles, and the Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela.

The central points of Bolivarianism, as extolled by Chávez, are:

> Venezuelan economic and political sovereignty (anti-imperialism).

> Grassroots political participation of the population via popular votes and referenda (participatory democracy).

> Economic self-sufficiency (in food, consumer durables, etc...).

> Instilling in people a national ethic of patriotic service.

> Equitable distribution of Venezuela's vast oil revenues.

> Eliminating corruption.

Chávez's version of Bolivarianism, although drawing heavily from Simón Bolívar's ideals, was also influenced by the writings of Marxist historian Federico Brito Figueroa and Argentinian political scientist Norberto Ceresole. Chávez was also thoroughly steeped in the South American tradition of socialism and communism early in his life, such as that practiced by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and Salvador Allende. Other key influences on Chávez's political philosophy include Ezequiel Zamora and Simón Rodríguez. This has been seen as seemingly contradictory, as Bolivar viewed himself as a supporter of free-markets and liberal rights, whilst current "Bolivarianism" includes neo-Marxist policies.

Although Chávez himself refers to his ideology as Bolivarianismo ("Bolivarianism"), Chávez's supporters and opponents in Venezuela refer to themselves as being either for or against "chavismo," indicating a public perception that Chávez's political philosophy does not originate from Bolívar so much as from his own views. Thus, Chávez supporters refer to themselves not as "Bolivarians" or "Bolivarianists," but rather as "chavistas."

Later in his life, Chávez would acknowledge the role that democratic socialism (a form of socialism that emphasizes grassroots democratic participation) plays in Bolivarianism. For example, on January 30, 2005 at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, Chávez declared his support for democratic socialism as integral to Bolivarianism, proclaiming that humanity must embrace "a new type of socialism, a humanist one, which puts humans, and not machines or the state, ahead of everything."

He later reiterated this sentiment in a February 26 speech at the 4th Summit on Social Debt held in Caracas.

I think what has the US government so greatly worried is that Bolivarianism talks about unifying Latin America, and the nightmare is a communist version of the European Union. Brazil would never go along with any attempt to unify Latin America, and the same could be said for Mexico. But I don't see why setting up favorable trade networks and greater development cooperation among Latin America's poor countries is a bad idea.

The simple truth is that for whatever reasons, the poorest in Latin America have not benefited from the IMF way of doing things. So, try something else. Chavez is trying. Does not mean he'll succeed but he's got astute advisors who appreciate the value of capitalism.

Revenge of the Banana Republics: Hugo Chavez's Southern Strategy gathers steam

It's becoming clear that it is misleading to apply the term "leftist" to the movement led by Hugo Chavez. The multinational strategy is a backlash against foreign control of key industries, but that doesn't make it leftist in the traditional sense. Consider the planned ALBA bond issue, which copies the capitalist approach of the World Bank to obtaining loan money:

Mr. Chavez ... raised the idea of issuing a regional bond to raise money for social spending as he hosted a summit of "the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas" (ALBA), a leftist bloc and trade group that includes Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia and Nicaragua.

"I proposed that we issue an ALBA bond. I hope that we can do it. ... And that we issue it here in Venezuela, as we did with Argentina, and bring in $1 billion," said Mr. Chavez, addressing leaders April 29 on final day of their talks. The Venezuelan president said the money acquired would be put in a fund to provide credit for ALBA nations.

Mr. Chavez and other leaders signed accords for Venezuela to supply fuel under preferential terms and join other countries in cooperative projects on education, telecommunications, mining and other areas.

He said Venezuela will guarantee to supply 100 percent of the energy needs of ALBA members plus Haiti. ALBA was created in 2004 by Cuba and Venezuela as a counterproposal to U.S. backed free-trade plans.

And in a move that can only be envied by US and European energy companies

Mr. Chavez said Venezuela eventually plans to help build a network of refineries in Nicaragua, Haiti, Ecuador, Bolivia and Dominica, and to refurbish Cuba's Cienfuegos refinery, to provide a stable supply of oil -- and the earnings it generates -- to Latin American countries. [...]

Under special oil arrangements offered by Venezuela, ALBA member nations will be able to finance 50 percent of the bill for fuel through low-interest loans, and 25 percent of the total bill will go into a special "ALBA Fund" to support local projects using loans, he said.

You know what he's talking about? How to put this in a few words -- he's talking about an intelligent development strategy that is specifically targeted to helping the poorest nations in the Western Hemisphere. This is what large development banks such as the World Bank were supposed to be doing all these decades.

Can it work? Sure it can work in the globalized era of employment opportunities. The traditional threat of the biggest commanding-heights companies that invest in developing countries is that they'll pull out all their technical assistance if their company is forced to leave. Be sure to shut the door behind you; today, technical assistance is readily available from the global employment pool.

Of course, getting control of the foreign-owned companies is never pretty.

Mr. Chavez began a nationalization drive in January to impose state control over "strategic" companies. His government took over multibillion-dollar oil operations from major foreign-oil companies last week and announced on Thursday that it would not be paying them cash compensation.

"We do not expect to pay out money in order to arrive at some arrangement with the companies," said Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez, according to the transcript of an interview with state television.

Mr. Ramirez did not elaborate on how else the government might compensate BP PLC, ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil Corp., Chevron Corp., France's Total SA and Norway's Statoil ASA, which have invested more than $17 billion in the projects.

Mr. Ramirez also said that one of the companies, Houston-based ConocoPhillips, would be expelled from the country and barred from staying on as a minority partner in a state-run joint venture if it continues to resist the state takeover. ConocoPhillips is the only oil company that has not signed an agreement in principle recognizing state control.

Isn't this a leftist ploy? In this context I'd call it hardball. What can you call a country where a huge majority of the citizens live in an abject poverty while a small elite dances with captains of foreign-owed strategic industries? "Right" and "Left" labels don't quite apply. "Fighting abject poverty entrenched in a nation for generations" applies.

Where is the U.S. Department of State Department in all this? On the moon. The failure of the US approach to Latin America, which since the 1980s has emphasized the IMF interpretation of the Trickle Down economic remedy for the world's poorest countries, is the starkest example of the foolishness of the US Euro-centric foreign policy.

In more news about Hugo Chavez's strategy, last week he announced that he plans to sell the seven oil refineries in the United States held by Venezuela's Citgo Petroleum Corporation. He's also going after the banks.

"Private banks have to give priority to financing the industrial sectors of Venezuela at low cost," Mr. Chavez said. "If banks don't agree with this, it's better that they go, that they turn over the banks to me, that we nationalize them and get all the banks to work for the development of the country and not to speculate and produce huge profits."

It was not clear if Mr. Chavez was referring only to Venezuelan banks like Mercantil Servicios Financieros CA and Banco Provincial SA, or also major foreign banks with subsidiaries in the country, like New York-based Citigroup Inc. and Spain's Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA and Banco Santander Central Hispano SA.

Mr. Chavez also warned that his government could take over steel producer Sidor, which is majority controlled by Luxembourg-based Ternium SA.[...]

Sidor "has created a monopoly" and sold most of its output overseas, forcing Venezuelan producers to import pipes from elsewhere, Mr. Chavez said.

The company should be giving priority to supplying national industries, he said, ordering Mining Minister Jose Khan to come back from Sidor's headquarters with a recommendation in 24 hours.

Sidor and banks in Venezuela did not respond to requests for comment.

"I don't think it'll happen immediately. They're just threats," said Franklin Rojas, director of Caracas-based economic institute CIECA.

Mr. Rojas noted that Mr. Chavez would likely run up against his close ally, Argentine President Nestor Kirchner, if he tried to nationalize Sidor, whose parent company, Ternium, is controlled by a major Argentine conglomerate, Techint Group.

Chavez is not making empty threats. He's taking the same approach as Russia's under Vladimir Putin. He's saying to put your own country first, then hop around the world. I wouldn't exactly call that an anti-globalist position. I'd call it a refutation of the Trickle Down theory when applied to very poor countries with a very small middle class.

Although Chavez says his revolution aims to create a classless society, he's actually taking actions to rapidly create a large middle class.

The real bottom line is that a nation's government can't be effective if it's hostage to foreign concerns that don't plow a substantial amount of their profits back into the nation.

All quotes in this post are from two May 8 Associated Press reports featured in The Washington Times Americas Briefing:

Chavez to sell refineries

Banks, top steel maker latest targets for nationalization

The Americas Briefing is published every Tuesday. Stay tuned.

The crumbling Core

Overview: the more inclusionary the United States tries to be in multilateral approaches, the more unclear our values and aims.

I asked ZenPundit Mark Safranski for his comments on my post, US 21st century foreign policy and wrong application of game theory, which references a column by Fareed Zakaria titled Losing Another War in Asia. Mark's reply focused on Thailand, one of the two countries that Fareed Zakaria mentioned in the course of passing along the observation that Asian leaders are reluctant to take measures seen as pro-American. Mark also zeroed in on remarks by Singapore's Lee Hsien Loong about US policy on Israel. To recap Lee's remarks:

[Lee] reminded [Zakaria] that nearly half of Southeast Asia's population is Muslim and said, "The single most important thing that the U.S. could do to shift its image in the region would be to take a more active role on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and in a balanced way. The issue is more important for Southeast Asia's Muslims than even Iraq."

"Hi, Miss P:
Singapore's critical G2G American relationship is with PACOM, not State. On the military boards I frequent and in reader email from active duty personnel, I hear nothing but praise for "The Singhs." As sailors have much to gripe about these days with nannyish Navy policies, it's a high compliment.

[However] Prime Minister Lee comes from a country with a stern record of summarily hanging infiltrators who are agents of disorder, including Muslim terrorists. They even elevated one instance in the 60's to international law precedent, their high court citing our Ex Parte Quirin decision. But most Americans are unaware of such things, including, I'm sure many people in our foreign affairs community.

Lee's statements sound nice for Singapore's large Muslim neighbors, which is why, in my view, he said it. After all, it costs Singapore nothing for its PM to prattle on with Mr. Zakaria; sacrificing some real Singaporean interest to get America to jerk Israel around is out of the question.

Thailand is a Buddhist nation with a shadowy Salafist insurgency bleed-over from Malaysia. They don't give a hang about the Palestinians and the Thai army is capable of effective counterinsurgency with American aid. So far, internal politics in Bangkok has occupied the senior generals' attention but if the army is forced to react, much like with the influx of Cambodians in the 70's, it will camp on the border if necessary.

Zakaria may be a better writer of prose than an analyst. Or he's spinning. I don't read him often enough though to tell.
Mark"

Dear Mark:
I recalled that you're interested in group dynamics and human networks, which I suppose is why I hoped you'd help me work through my intuitions about Zakaria's piece. Yet I was so busy trying to figure out what Zakaria is really driving at that I neglected to consider the context in which Lee was advising him on Asian matters; your observations fill in the blanks.

That Zakaria didn't make an effort to mention Singapore's position suggests that he wasn't trying to analyze Lee's remarks; he simply found them handy to his argument that the US government needs to do more to woo Asia.

What does "doing more" entail? Zakaria holds up China's approach to foreign relations as a model.

Beijing has become remarkably adept at using its political and economic muscle in a patient, low-key and highly effective manner. China's diplomacy emphasizes its core strengths -- a long-term perspective, a nonpreachy attitude and strategic decision-making that isn't bogged down by internal opposition or bureaucratic paralysis.

Over the last decade, for example, China has greatly improved its historically tense relations with Southeast Asia. It's taken a more accommodating political line, provided generous aid packages (often far outstripping those provided by the United States) and moved speedily on a free-trade deal with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Japan wanted to cut a similar deal but has dithered, racked by power struggles between political and bureaucratic factions in Tokyo. The United States can't even begin such a conversation with ASEAN because we will not talk to Burma. One result: this summer China plans to hold military exercises with some of these countries, most of which have been U.S. allies for decades. [...]

Zakaria goes on to say that "no one is comfortable with an Asia dominated by China" then turns to Lee for advice on how the US might become more popular in Southeast Asia. In part that's what prompted my remark that the world is not high school.

The other part is what keeps me pacing the floor and asking myself why I'm so bent out of shape by Zakaria's piece -- and I'm not satisfied with my dig about a misapplication of game theory, whether or not it's correct.

Zakaria's observations are part of a cacophony of advice arising from many quarters that boils down to the need for the US to be more multilateral and more accommodating to a vaunted new multipolar world order. Perhaps Zakaria's most telling remark is:

Few people in Asia are actively pining for "the Chinese Dream" because it's not really clear what that is -- and to the extent that there is one it sounds suspiciously like the American Dream.

It is very easy for China to present itself as being in sync with the American Dream because the United States and China are big trading partners; both are members of big multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, and the World Bank; and the US seeks China's help in multilateral negotiations such as the six party talks.

Multilateralism works to the extent that there is a cohesive group with a cohesive agenda. It collapses when the group has unlimited membership with wildly different and even starkly opposing agendas. This is exactly what has happened at the World Bank, UN, WTO, and to a lessor extent NATO.

A multilateral approach can be effective when the goal is carefully circumscribed, as in the Sharm el-Sheikh summit on the UN international compact with Iraq; there the goal was simply to internationalize help to Iraq. Yet I think Zakaria's advice is symbolic of a policy movement in Washington that applies multilateralism indiscriminately, or grossly distorts the concept. They sound like high school students who feel they can't survive unless they merge their identity with what they think is the prevailing view in the school halls.

The upshot is that Barnett's "Core" is in danger of collapsing under the law of unintended consequences -- a situation that the European Parliament is already wrestling with as more countries pile into the European Union. On the American front, a slapstick element is entering US policy decisions:

"Say, let's promote India and Brazil for the UN Security Council!" Oops, India and Iran are becoming big trade partners. And now our oldest European allies are worried that their influence at the UN will be lessened by the addition of newer powers. And what are we going to do about Brazil joining Hugo Chavez's Bank of the South?

The attempt to control or influence by inclusion is heading toward silliness, as witness Condoleezza Rice's recent remarks that Saudi Arabia's regime is "moderate" and "mainstream."

("What's moderate about Saudi Arabia?" [Natan] Sharansky demanded. "Its record of religious tolerance?")(1)

But State is convinced that the US needs Saudi Arabia to help resolve sectarian violence in Iraq, so calling the Saudi rulers moderate and mainstream is a nice way to rationalize making a tyranny a leader in helping Iraq's democracy. Yet each time the United States makes such accommodations, the more muddied US objectives seem to outside observers.

Of course this is not a perfect world, in particular for a superpower nation, and yet the more the US feels pressed to engage with despotic governments, the more care needed to distinguish US aims from those held by governments that oppose democracy.

So I think it's time to take a deep breath and review the context in which the US raised up large multilateral institutions. The world was a different place then; maintaining a Core that held together was relatively easy. But the very success of the Core from the mid-20th Century onward in bringing along many nations means that today, regionalism and bilateral agreements drive the policies of the rising powers -- and the developing nations they do big trade with. These policies understandably conflict with US aims in many ways, and attempts to accommodate the policies greatly dilute American policy objectives.

So what's the solution for the US? One approach would be to recast US multilateralism not according to a core of entities (nations) or trade practices but a core of shared values.

I have never heard a good argument against the US setting up an American international development bank, along the lines of the World Bank. There's no reason why the US couldn't set up such a bank, and make nation membership conditional on democratic government.

The same approach could be applied to creating a version of the United Nations that tags membership to democratic government.

In short don't abandon multilateralism, just abandon what it's become, which is a cauldron of democratic and anti-democratic aims with the latter overwhelming good policy initiatives by the democracies.

This does not necessarily mean abandoning membership in the World Bank or UN or multilateral trade agreements based on WTO criteria for inclusion. It means drawing a line at the dangerous premise that the democratic notion should be applied to the amount of say that nations have in a multilateral gathering. If it's "one nation, one vote" -- today a majority of the world's nations are nondemocratic and a solid majority among those are virulently anti-democratic.(2)

"Pundita:
I think you are correct that the nature of multilateralism is changing and that we have not been doing very well in recognizing that fact.

Some of our political appointees are not entirely cognizant of the help other states could provide if they are properly incentivized (the French professional intel/ military folks, for example, should be well regarded). On the other hand, most of the SES level bureaucrats have outdated expectations of Europe that seem to have frozen around the time Pompidou was president of France.

The outward pressure provided by the Soviets that reinforced Western solidarity has vanished and, with the emergence of a vacuum, the Western states have drifted apart to an extent, following their national interests.

I think our best bet is to plan on crafting policies that attract allies on the basis of their economic self-interest (the more corrupt they are, the shorter the time horizon we should have in mind).

In my opinion we can gather a constellation of bystander-mendicant states to shout Kumbayah with us after we have attracted the help of the genuinely useful states like Australia or India (useful meaning "have troops who can and will stand and fight" -- in this sense a company of Peshmerga are worth a division of the Dutch).

Thomas Barnett divides the Core into "Old" (US, Western Europe, Japan) and "New" (Russia, India, China, E. Europe - Brazil is on the edge, a "seam" state, as is Turkey). Currently he sees the New Core as more pragmatic and having the initiative in setting the tone of emerging international rules, like China's "non-preachy" relationship with African horror states like Sudan and Zimbabwe.

I think we will see other New Core states imitate China's foreign policy stance as they do not have the resources on the margin to offer (or threaten) more. Barnett believes the U.S. has room to lead here but the current administration lacks the imagination to capitalize diplomatically on their recognized willingness to use force.

(I think the administration is deeply divided at the senior levels on strategic policy with Bush in the middle as reluctant and erratic arbiter.)

I do not think China is our friend or our enemy. A friend [...] once described the Sino-American relationship to me as "golden handcuffs." Our economy is now integral to the stability of the rule of the CCP, which has to produce a dramatic level of real GDP growth to maintain political legitimacy. They hedge their economic system with enormous dollar reserves. It is a bizarre symbiotic relationship that I'm not sure Nixon had entirely anticipated (certainly Mao did not).
Mark"

Mark,
Thanks for your additional comments. This is a fascinating discussion about a very important subject. So, while I am going to end this long post here, I will close with what I hope is a leading question: If there is a new core and old core, which is the core? Can there be two cores?

1) A Lasting Freedom Agenda, Jackson Diehl, The Washington Post

2) UN A Haven For Despots, Fred Gedrich, The Washington Times

Congratulations, President Sarkozy

If the United States wasn't at war, I would have stayed up all night partying over the news that a strongly pro-American Frenchman was now France's President. By 2003, I had learned that joy is out of place in war. Casting out joy is the only way I could avoid the other extreme of despair. Yet the thought of an era of genuinely warm relations between a French government and Washington is very heartening. Now for the cold realities.

President Nicolas Sarkozy's promised economic reforms face great opposition from France's unions and the Left, and even the most pro-change French know the reforms will cause widespread pain. Sarkozy would be a fool to rile the Left any more than he has to. So Americans shouldn't get their hopes up that Sarkozy's election means a radical shift in US-French relations in the near term; we should be happy with slow fence mending. The only place I might hope to see changes soon is in France's approach to Iraq, but I sit hard on the impulse to hope.

Sarkozy will have his coming out party as an international leader at the G8 summit next month. For now, a quick trip around the Middle East and Africa for immediate reactions to Sarkozy's victory:

Both sides of the Israel-Arab divide see hope in Sarkozy's election victory. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said he is confident that Israel’s relations with France will strengthen during Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency. In the past, Israel’s relations with France were often tense, with Israeli leaders viewing Paris policy toward the Jewish state as one-sided in favor of the Palestinians. Benjamin Netanyahu, head of the conservative Likud opposition party, called the election of Sarkozy good news for relations between Israel and France.

“Sarkozy is a friend of Israel and my personal friend. He wants to work in favor of peace and security for Israel,” the former Prime Minister was quoted as saying by the Israeli radio. (1)

Syria and Hezbollah have expressed hope that Sarkozy will bring a more "balanced" approach to France's relations with Lebanon and Syria.

President Bashar Assad in a telegram expressed hopes that relations between Syria and France, which have been marred for the past two years, "would develop for the two countries' interests" [...]

Chirac has led the international charge in support of Lebanon, organizing in January a Paris donors' conference that raised more than US$7 billion in soft loans and grants for Lebanon. In addition, he sent French troops as peacekeepers to southern Lebanon to monitor a cease-fire that ended the fighting last year between Hezbollah and Israel.

Chirac's involvement in Lebanon caused a stir last year when Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, a pro-Syrian, publicly criticized the French president. The unusual high level rift was seen as the lowest point in bilateral relations since Lebanon gained independence from France in 1943.

Lahoud has urged Chirac to stop intervening in Lebanese domestic affairs, accusing him of siding with the anti-Syrian governing faction. He even blamed Chirac for excluding the Lebanese leader from a summit of French-speaking nations held in Romania in September. Chirac has rejected the charges.

Understandably, Lebanon's governing coalition hoped Sarkozy's presidency would mean continued French support.

Within minutes of the results, Saad Hariri, head of the parliamentary majority in Lebanon and son of slain leader Rafik Hariri, sent a message of congratulations to Sarkozy, expressing confidence that historic ties will continue to develop."This is the hope of all the Lebanese who remember France and the French for their permanent stand toward their causes, and this I pledge to continue to work to achieve it in my political and parliamentary position in Lebanon," Saad Hariri said in a statement.

The late Rafik Hariri was a friend of Chirac and the outgoing president is leading the efforts to create an international tribunal to try killers of the former prime minister.

There has been quiet concern in the country's parliamentary majority that with Chirac leaving office, personal, hands-on involvement by France may become a thing of the past.

The governing coalition in Beirut needs French backing, particularly in the U.N. Security Council, which discussed the tribunal last week and could adopt it without Lebanon's approval because of a deadlock between the government and opposition over its formation.(2)

On the Iran front, we can imagine that Tehran isn't jumping for joy. Sarkozy is expected to push for a tough stand against Iran's attempts to build nukes and their anti-Israel actions. In late April he told an interviewer that Iran represents

"the most important problem on the international scene." The calls made by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the destruction of Israel are the most profound threat to international peace, he said.(3)

On the African front, African leaders in countries that see large numbers migrating to France have greeted Sarkozy's victory with caution:

President Bouteflika of Algeria said the French people had chosen "a man of action", President Wade of Senegal called it "a brilliant election".

But the messages have been lukewarm at best, reflecting the uncertainty his win brings for French ties with Africa.

Mr Sarkozy has spoken of reforms in France`s relationship with Africa, in particular over immigration and trade.

Some African leaders are concerned Mr Sarkozy`s notions of reform could be a double-edged sword with uncertain consequences for the continent.

Mr Sarkozy lacks the personal contacts in Africa and the Middle East that Jacques Chirac and Francois Mitterrand enjoyed before and during their presidencies.[...] (4)

1) European Jewish Press

2) Associated Press via International Herald Tribune

3) EURSOC

4) Angola Press

China's toxic medicine counterfeiting causes mass deaths

China's counterfeiters have been using a poisonous industrial solvent in counterfeit cough syrup and other liquid cold medications, which has caused mass deaths around the world.

China's is not the only government aiding and abetting the Harry Limes of the world, but it's the biggest and most frightening example of the harm that is done through lax measures against counterfeit medications. The following New York Times investigatory article is long so I'm only posting the first part, which is enough to warn the reader in the starkest terms.

I hope the fallout from the NY Times report will put counterfeiting high on the list of discussion items at the upcoming G8 Summit and galvanizes the US and all other nations to tighten up on safety regulations for imported medicines.

From China to Panama, a Trail of Poisoned Medicine
By WALT BOGDANICH and JAKE HOOKER with contributions from Renwick McLean and Brent McDonald
The New York Times, May 6, 2007

The kidneys fail first. Then the central nervous system begins to misfire. Paralysis spreads, making breathing difficult, then often impossible without assistance. In the end, most victims die.

Many of them are children, poisoned at the hands of their unsuspecting parents. The syrupy poison, diethylene glycol, is an indispensable part of the modern world, an industrial solvent and prime ingredient in some antifreeze. It is also a killer. And the deaths, if not intentional, are often no accident.

Over the years, the poison has been loaded into all varieties of medicine -- cough syrup, fever medication, injectable drugs -- a result of counterfeiters who profit by substituting the sweet-tasting solvent for a safe, more expensive syrup, usually glycerin, commonly used in drugs, food, toothpaste and other products.

Toxic syrup has figured in at least eight mass poisonings around the world in the past two decades. Researchers estimate that thousands have died. In many cases, the precise origin of the poison has never been determined. But records and interviews show that in three of the last four cases it was made in China, a major source of counterfeit drugs.

Panama is the most recent victim. Last year, government officials there unwittingly mixed diethylene glycol into 260,000 bottles of cold medicine -- with devastating results. Families have reported 365 deaths from the poison, 100 of which have been confirmed so far. With the onset of the rainy season, investigators are racing to exhume as many potential victims as possible before bodies decompose even more.

Panama’s death toll leads directly to Chinese companies that made and exported the poison as 99.5 percent pure glycerin. Forty-six barrels of the toxic syrup arrived via a poison pipeline stretching halfway around the world. Through shipping records and interviews with government officials, The New York Times traced this pipeline from the Panamanian port of Colón, back through trading companies in Barcelona, Spain, and Beijing, to its beginning near the Yangtze Delta in a place local people call “chemical country.”

The counterfeit glycerin passed through three trading companies on three continents, yet not one of them tested the syrup to confirm what was on the label. Along the way, a certificate falsely attesting to the purity of the shipment was repeatedly altered, eliminating the name of the manufacturer and previous owner. As a result, traders bought the syrup without knowing where it came from, or who made it. With this information, the traders might have discovered -- as The Times did -- that the manufacturer was not certified to make pharmaceutical ingredients.

An examination of the two poisoning cases last year -- in Panama and earlier in China -- shows how China’s safety regulations have lagged behind its growing role as low-cost supplier to the world. It also demonstrates how a poorly policed chain of traders in country after country allows counterfeit medicine to contaminate the global market.

Last week, the United States Food and Drug Administration warned drug makers and suppliers in the United States “to be especially vigilant” in watching for diethylene glycol. The warning did not specifically mention China, and it said there was “no reason to believe” that glycerin in this country was tainted. Even so, the agency asked that all glycerin shipments be tested for diethylene glycol, and said it was “exploring how supplies of glycerin become contaminated.”

China is already being accused by United States authorities of exporting wheat gluten containing an industrial chemical, melamine, that ended up in pet food and livestock feed. The F.D.A. recently banned imports of Chinese-made wheat gluten after it was linked to pet deaths in the United States.

Beyond Panama and China, toxic syrup has caused mass poisonings in Haiti, Bangladesh, Argentina, Nigeria and twice in India. In Bangladesh, investigators found poison in seven brands of fever medication in 1992, but only after countless children died. A Massachusetts laboratory detected the contamination after Dr. Michael L. Bennish, a pediatrician who works in developing countries, smuggled samples of the tainted syrup out of the country in a suitcase.

Dr. Bennish, who investigated the Bangladesh epidemic and helped write a 1995 article about it for BMJ, formerly known as the British Medical Journal, said that given the amount of medication distributed, deaths “must be in the thousands or tens of thousands.” [...](1)

1)
http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/05/06/world/06poison.html?hp

De-escalating the Syria-Israel confrontation

Visit Riehl World View for a roundup of news and interesting opinion on Condoleezza Rice's meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh with her Syrian counterpart. The meeting takes on great importance in light of David Makovsky's analysis of whether Israel and Syria are headed to war. Makovsky's advice specifically addresses UN Security Resolution 1701, which was the outcome of last summer's war between Hezbollah and Israel.

[1701] deployed thousands of U.N. peacekeepers to southern Lebanon. The presence of such forces there has constrained Hezbollah, even though the peacekeepers have not attempted to disarm Hezbollah fighters. However, a key provision of the resolution -- an international embargo to prevent weaponry from entering Lebanon -- has not been met. Just two weeks ago the Security Council voiced concern that this resolution has not been implemented fully.

It has been widely reported that arms from Syria are being smuggled into Lebanon, and Israeli officials say that Hezbollah is hiding Syrian-manufactured 220mm rockets just beyond the jurisdiction of the peacekeepers but within range of northern Israel.

There is open speculation in Israel and Lebanon about the possibility of the conflict resuming this summer.

Two other factors add fuel to the fire. First, Syria is colluding with Hezbollah to destabilize the Lebanese government, fearing Beirut's commitment to prosecuting the killers of former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, the beloved leader slain in February 2005.

Second, in an eerie echo of the run-up to the 1967 war, U.S. and Israeli officials say Moscow is once again telling Damascus that Israel has plans to attack Syria. Israeli security officials say that Syria's new military deployments reflect this Russian advice. Concerned that such a deployment might dangerously turn from defensive to offensive, Olmert took the unusual step of declaring last month that Israel has no desire to start a war with Syria. But the prospects for miscalculation remain high.

Syria believes that Israel sees war as a means of regaining a deterrent that was weakened last summer, and Israel believes that Syria sees its relationship with Iran and Hezbollah as a winning combination.

On top of all this, Hamas's approach to a cease-fire in Gaza is one of observation, not enforcement. Specifically, Hamas has done nothing to halt the firing of more than a thousand Qassam rockets from Gaza, which Israel evacuated from in 2005, into southern Israel over the past year, and last week it publicly asserted responsibility for some such attacks. The cease-fire has never been defined, so there are no obligations constraining the Israelis or Palestinians.

It is worth recalling that Hezbollah's provocative attack last summer was staged in sympathy: It kidnapped two soldiers after Hamas kidnapped Israeli Cpl. Gilad Shalit last June.Amid all these problems, and given Olmert's teetering position and the Arab League's insistence after its March summit in Riyadh that its peace plan is a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, it is hard to believe that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will succeed in negotiating a "political horizon" -- namely, fleshing out guiding principles that would govern a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- until the Israeli political situation stabilizes and there is greater clarity about and a moderate direction to the Palestinian "unity government."

This situation does not argue for U.S. passivity. Rather, Rice should lead an international coalition to defuse multiple looming crises in Arab-Israeli arenas. The international community can and should agree to follow up U.N. Resolution 1701 with one involving the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping troops on the Syrian-Lebanese border. Avoiding another outbreak of violence could make Rice's political horizon a more likely possibility once the Israeli leadership crisis eases.