Yo, State: how do you explain this?

China wins first Afghan oil extraction contract. Oh but that's right I forgot: you were so busy helping Pakistan scare up American investors to mine Thar coal after China pulled out of the deal that you didn't have time to negotiate with that bunch of losers in Kabul's ministry of mines and precious metals, or whatever it's called.

Speaking of Thar coal, if you want to start the week with a belly laugh read Fouad Khan's beautifully researched and written analysis for the (Pakistan) Express Tribune, Chasing a pipe dream: three reasons why Thar coal will not save Pakistan. Just a little preview:

The fixed carbon content of Thar coal is less than 22%. The low carbon content translates into low energy generation capacity, which means that if energy is invested into transporting the lignite from source to point of consumption, the net energy output of the mining, extraction, transportation and conversion process becomes less than zero; you end up investing more energy making energy out of coal than you get out of it in terms of megawatts. In order to get any energy out of lignite, it has to be converted into electricity almost entirely onsite; where it is being mined. Which brings us to the first reason why Thar coal will not save Pakistan.

There isn’t enough water
[...]

Gee I hope the Thar-Pak folks don't read the Express Tribune if their intention is actually to help Pakistan; I think that's the name of the American coal-mining consortium that was thrown together.

Where was I? China snapping up contracts in Afghanistan that should have gone to the USA seeing how Americans are spilling so much of their blood there and all.

I know; it's not State's fault. It's never State's fault because it was born under an unlucky star. When you're wrong there's a President in office who follows your advice. When you're right it so happens there's a President who won't listen to a word you say. And then there are presidents, such as Obama, with a built-in homing device: if State is right that means he doesn't listen; if it's wrong he loves the advice.

But has it ever occurred to State that Foggy Bottom might be built on top of a Native Indian burial ground? I'm serious; maybe the problem is not in the stars. It could be ghosts. In that case State doesn't need a bigger budget; it needs a shaman or two. Have them do a blessing ceremony to pacify any angry spirits hanging out in the halls. Or State could always solve the problem by relocating its headquarters to somewhere else. Like Brussels.

All right, all right, Pundita; somebody get the hook because I could on like this for the rest of week.

Urgent advice for State: Warn Obama to stop pushing the envelope (UPDATED 2X)

UPDATE 2:05 PM ET January 29
Adding two important news reports to the footnotes, both of which I'd misplaced at the time I published this post and just found.

Footnote #1: Egypt faces hurdles in securing IMF aid, January 25, Reuters. Although the January 25 report doesn't contain the news about the billion dollar-'bridge' loan that I'd mentioned in the text, it presents key observations that were dropped from the updated January 26 Reuters report I'd originally linked to.

Footnote #8: Pakistan stoking anti-Indian sentiments to divert attention from the heat at home, January 26, Times of India. At first glance this report doesn't differ markedly from the one in The Hindu about the LeT 'resurgence' in Pakistan but it brings out points which underscore the seriousness of the development, and not only for India. LeT is one of the world's most dangerous international terrorist organizations; that Pakistan's military let its leader out of his cage at home at this juncture is almost beyond belief. Almost.
******************
I was sitting on the patio one morning six years ago, enjoying the quiet and early Spring weather, when I heard the most godawful sound. I'd barely blurted, "What the --?" when I learned the sound was a squirrel's idea of a battle cry issuing from maybe 200 squirrel throats. All the squirrels in the neighborhood, it seemed, had banded together to run off a large rat and the chase was taking them through my back yard. I never saw or heard anything like it my life. And let me tell you that rat was burning rubber. Never saw a rat run so fast.

I told this story not to insult any government but to graphically illustrate that when sufficiently provoked and desperate, even the weakest governments can set the mighty United States back on its heels. Once this gets underway it can snowball into a trend.

With all such situations it's perceptions of American actions that count, or to be more precise the perceived pattern of actions. During the past year the perceived pattern is that President Barack Obama is throwing his weight around the world, everywhere he can.

I understand that Obama can cite reasons for each instance in which he's crashed national borders in pursuit of the bad guys. Yet the perception is that Obama has gotten hold of two very efficient lethal weapons -- U.S. Special Forces teams and armed drones -- and is deploying them anywhere in the world he sees fit.

But even President George W. Bush and his most aggressive predecessors in the Cold War managed to meddle in ways that didn't make it look as if the entire planet was suddenly under surprise attack from the United States. They knew when to back off -- and they were operating in a communications era when their every move in a foreign country wasn't broadcast around the world.

Times have changed. It's the piling-on phenomenon that's leading people to these perceptions Okay, so you wanted to shoot rockets at al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan's badlands. Okay, so you had to support Sarkozy's war against Gaddafi. Okay, so you had shoot rockets at al Qaeda in Yemen. Okay, so you had to take out Osama bin Laden when you found him. Okay, so you had to rescue an American citizen who was kidnapped by common criminals.

But all of these "okay" situations are piled on top of Obama expressing public support for Egypt's democracy activists and as much telling Mubarak to decamp. And piled on top of meddling in spectacular fashion in Pakistan's internal affairs. And starting a cold war with Iran's regime not to mention starting a cold war with Syria's regime.

All this within the space of a year.

I don't need to tell State that the juntas in Pakistan and Egypt are in absolutely desperate straits. They are both staring at the imminent prospect of a complete economic collapse in their countries. And the fear is that raising loans amounting to a billion dollars from the World Bank and African Development Bank until the IMF can (if it chooses) to bail them out might not be enough to stave off economic collapse in Egypt. (1)

Nor should I need to tell State that both juntas have broad and deep support in their respective countries, if for no other reason than the large number of civilians the businesses owned by the juntas employ.

So a reasonable person would assume that last month, after Egypt's junta gave a clear warning to the Obama administration to back off in Egypt, State would have immediately yanked the Democratic and Republican party NGOs that were operating in Egypt. I mean -- how much more of a warning do you need, when a security force raids the NGOs and confiscates their computers while the junta accuses the NGOs of being fronts for the American government and meddling in Egypt's internal affairs? (2)

But no, the NGOs continued to operate in Egypt -- all for a good cause, of course -- after State pulled their irons out of the fire in December. Now we learn as of yesterday some Americans working for the NGOs have been barred from leaving Egypt. This is a prelude to arrest warrants being issued -- or at least that's the implied threat of the action to prevent the Americans (and some Europeans who work for othe ngos from leaving Egypt. (2)

Obama is understandably furious about the situation but he could have seen this coming even before Mubarak left office. And now Egypt's generals believe they have no other choice but to find a scapegoat for the country's economic crisis. The Obama administration's ill-conceived attempt to bring more democracy to Egypt, which is using a very small number of Egyptians, has handed the junta the perfect goat.

Now I turn to Pakistan. The country is not only facing economic collapse but it's also in the throes of the worst fuel crisis in its history. (3) So why has the Obama administration decided that this is the perfect time to turn the heat up on Iran by trying to get Pakistan's regime to abandon the gas pipeline Iran is building for them, and sign up to get gas from the TAPI pipeline? (4)(5)

Is the answer that chipmunks are managing the Pakistan portfolio for the Obama administration? I ask this also because this is the same question they're asking in Afghanistan. I mean -- our war office and State couldn't even keep track of containers being transshipped through Pakistan, many of those containers containing desperately needed food supplies for Afghans.

Why "desperate?" Because the Obama administration and Congress haven't wanted the Afghan government to use an Iranian route for shipping food to Afghanistan and because the Northern Distribution Network, where it's the middle of winter anyway, is full up with shipping war supplies for NATO. So they've had a food shortage in Afghanistan, which has driven food prices, even for food basics, through the roof.

But how can you lose track of almost 160,000 shipping containers? The containers have disappeared in Pakistan. Gone! Poof! (6)

And not to put too fine a point on it but the U.S. command can't even win a war against a bunch of guys in baggy pants who take their orders from Rawalpindi. What's been the Obama strategy to deal with this situation? Play patty-cake with the Emir of Qatar and increase meddling in Pakistan. (7)

What has the answer been from Pakistan's junta? They've let Lashkar-e-Taiba out of its cage in Pakistan. (8) Do I have to draw stick figures to explain to State what that implies?

For starters, the junta is saying to forget Doha; the Obama administration can negotiate a truce with Mullah Omar all it wants, and it won't mean squat to LeT, which just might take the prize as the world's most dangerous international terrorist organization. (9) The larger implication is that the junta is signaling Obama that if he's worried about international terrorists taking over Pakistan's nuke weapons, the worry is misplaced because the junta will simply hand them a nuke if they get any angrier at him.

I understand that little blame for the entire mess I've described above can be laid at State's door. But someone has to take responsibility for conveying the facts of life to President Obama and State has to be the designated fool in this instance.

In summary, this is one of those times it's crucial for the American government to practice message discipline across the board. Sometimes you can have it all, but if you try to have it all at the same time, you sow the impression that you're crazy. That's a fast way to replace respect with fear. When people become afraid that you're both crazy and hogging their turf, they act in the same way a bunch of Washington squirrels did one fine morning.

1) January 26, Egypt says to seek extra $1 billion to support budget; Reuters

Egypt said on Thursday it would ask the World Bank for a $500 million loan and another $500 million loan from the African Development Bank to help it fill a budget gap widened by a year of political and economic turmoil.

Egypt has also persuaded the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce the interest rate it would charge on $3.2 billion loan Cairo had requested from the IMF, Planning and International Cooperation Minister Faiza Abu el-Naga told reporters.

"We have achieved a reduction from the IMF on the interest rate on the loan from 1.5 to 1.1 percent," she said, adding that this would put the cost of the finance more in line with interest rates worldwide.

The turmoil in Egypt has pushed up unemployment, widened its budget and balance of payments deficits and drained its foreign reserves. Many economists believe a currency devaluation is imminent.

Egypt announced earlier this month it had formally asked the IMF for an aid package, saying it wanted the money as soon as possible and hoped an agreement would be signed within weeks.

The IMF, however, says any agreement would have to be accompanied by financial commitments from other international donors and attract broad political support within the country.

Thrashing out the technical details of a loan will take two to three months, it said.

The World Bank and African Development Bank loans would carry an interest rate of between 7 and 8 percent, Abu el-Naga said. Egypt would request a mission from the World Bank come to Egypt soon, she added, without giving details or a date.The central bank, trying to keep the Egyptian pound stable against the dollar, has run through $9 billion of its foreign reserves since June, when the government rejected an IMF agreement similar to the one it is now seeking.

The depletion accelerated before the parliamentary election and during a series of violent political protests in November and December, with the central bank spending at least $2 billion in each of the last three months. By the end of December, reserves had fallen to $18 billion.

January 25, Egypt faces hurdles in securing IMF aid; Patrick Werr, Reuters

2) January 27, 2012: Egypt Bans Travel for 10 U.S. Citizens; Ben Hubbard, Associated Press via TIME online

CAIRO) — Egypt banned at least 10 Americans and Europeans from leaving the country, including the son of U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray Lahood, hiking tensions with Washington over a campaign by Egypt's military against groups promoting democracy and human rights.

The United States warned Thursday that the campaign raised concerns about Egypt's transition to democracy and could jeopardize American aid that Egypt's battered economy needs badly after a year of unrest. [...]

The travel ban was part of an Egyptian criminal investigation into foreign-funded democracy organizations after soldiers raided the offices of 10 such groups last month, including those of two American groups.

The investigation is closely intertwined with Egypt's political turmoil since the fall of Hosni Mubarak nearly a year ago. The generals who took power have accused "foreign hands" of being behind protests against their rule and they frequently depict the protesters themselves as receiving foreign funds in a plot to destabilize the country.
[...]

3) January 25, 2012: Energy Deficit Renders Punjab Uncompetitive; Dawn (Pakistan)

4) In the first version of this post I referred to the TAPI pipeline as "crazy;" without getting into a discussion of TAPI, I had it confused in my mind with the Nabucco gas pipeline. So many pipelines to keep straight.

5) This report is undated although it was surely published within the past week; I'm linking to this version rather than the International Herald Tribune report because of the wording of the title supplied by the Pakistani website that quotes IHT: US enticing Pakistan with cheap gas; Online International News Network (Pakistan)

6) January 27, 2012: Afghanistan bound 157,736 US containers; Aftab Maken, The News International (Pakistan)

ISLAMABAD: The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) on Thursday made a stunning revelation before the Senate Standing Committee on Commerce that a total of 157,736 containers of the United States destined to Afghanistan have never reached the landlocked country and disappeared inside Pakistan.
[...]

7) January 25, 2012: Brahma Chellaney learns U.S. Afghan War exit strategy is literally full of gas; Pundita

8) January 24, 2012:Hafiz Saeed ‘threatens' India; Hasan Suror, The Hindu

In a spectacle guaranteed to “send a chill through New Delhi,” as The Financial Times put it, Hafiz Saeed, the suspected mastermind behind the 2008 Mumbai terror bombings, is being feted in Pakistan as a “hero” attracting thousands of people as he “criss-crosses” the country at the head of a radical road-show targeting India and calling for “jihad.”
[...]

January 26, 2012: Pakistan stoking anti-Indian sentiments to divert attention from the heat at home; Times of India

9) January 26, 2012: What's wrong with the following sentence?, Pundita

STRIKE UP THE BAND! HAMID KARZAI MAKES A SMART DECISION!

This is what I've been waiting for:

Associated Press, 7:40 PM EDT, UPDATED 8:00 PM:

Afghan president gives up trying to talk with Taliban
By DEB RIECHMANN

Kabul, Afghanistan (AP) President Hamid Karzai has given up trying to talk to the Taliban, saying in a video released Saturday that Pakistan holds the only key to making peace with insurgents and must do more to support a political resolution to the war.

Karzai revealed his tougher stance against Pakistan, which he claims is harboring militants, on the same day that the Afghan intelligence service said it has hard evidence that the assassination of former President Burhanuddin Rabbani was planned on the southern outskirts of Quetta, the Pakistani city where key Taliban leaders are based.

Interior Minister Bismullah Khan Mohammadi went even further, stating in an Afghan parliamentary session that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency was involved in Rabbani’s killing — an allegation Pakistan has denied.

"Without any doubt, ISI is involved in this," Mohammadi told Afghan lawmakers on Saturday.

The claims follow similar accusations against Pakistan from the United States, reflecting the growing frustrations with a central player in the region whose cooperation is crucial even as its intentions are under question.

Critics have accused the Pakistani government of protecting Taliban leaders to maintain good relations with the group in anticipation of Western forces’ eventual withdrawal from the country — an allegation denied by Pakistan. Many analysts also believe the ISI’s alleged support for insurgent groups is an attempt to promote Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan and counter the influence of archenemy India, which Karzai plans to visit this week.

Addressing a public rally on Saturday, Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani offered to share intelligence on Rabbani’s assassination and said his nation was ready to hold talks with anyone interested in peace. Most of the Taliban leadership is thought to be living in Pakistan, and its governing council, the Quetta Shura, is named after the Pakistani city.

Calling Karzai his brother and friend, Gilani said, "He has some misunderstanding on the assassination of Professor Rabbani."

Aw, put a sock in it, Gilani.

As for Karzai: Make sure, make goddamn sure, that this time you don't give into pressure from the U.S. and the U.K. regimes; no matter what they throw at you stand by your words today. They pressure you again, and they will, they blackmail you again, and they will, they threaten you again, and they will, just tell 'em, 'I refuse to keep taking orders from fiends -- and governments that knowingly pay another government to murder their own troops are nothing more than a collection of fiends -- fiends and ghouls.'

As to the perils of telling a fiend straight to its face that it's a fiend -- yes, well, that's a conundrum I've never quite resolved for myself, so I am not taking the high road with Karzai. But I do know from experience that there are times when one has no option but to name evil for what it is and yes, tell it straight out that you know you're confronting a real fiend. I think that now is one of those times for Hamid Karzai.

Rawalpindi wants proof

September 13:

Taliban launch complex attack on US embassy in Kabul
By Bill Roggio
Long War Journal

The Taliban launched a complex daylight attack on the US embassy and NATO headquarters in a secured area of Kabul this afternoon. While suicide bombers targeted the Kabul civil order police station and another police station a few kilometers away, fighters armed with rifles and RPGs fired at the embassy and NATO headquarters. Another suicide bomber was killed on a road near the airport.
[...]
The Taliban have conducted several high-profile attacks in the Afghan capital this year. On Aug. 18, a suicide assault team killed eight people at the office of the British Council. On June 28, a suicide assault team stormed the Intercontinental Hotel and killed 13 people. On June 18, a suicide assault team attacked a police station near the Interior Ministry, killing eight people. On May 21, a suicide bomber killed six people in a hospital. On April 28, a suicide bomber penetrated security at the Ministry of Defense, killing two soldiers and wounding several senior officials. On February 24, a suicide bomber detonated outside of the Safi Landmark hotel, killing two people. And on January 28, a suicide assault team killed eight people at the Finest grocery.

Today's suicide attack, like the others in Kabul, was likely carried out by the Kabul Attack Network, which is made up of fighters from the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and cooperates with terror groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and al Qaeda. Top Afghan intelligence officials have linked the Kabul Attack Network to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate as well. The network's tentacles extend outward from Kabul into the surrounding provinces of Logar, Wardak, Nangarhar, Kapisa, Ghazni, and Zabul, a US intelligence official recently told The Long War Journal.
[...]

September 15:

U.S. warns Pakistan after suspected Haqqani attack
By Phil Stewart
Reuters
11:19am IST (Indian Standard Time)

(SAN FRANCISCO) - Defence Secretary Leon Panetta warned Pakistan on Wednesday the United States would "do everything we can" to defend U.S. forces from Pakistan-based militants staging attacks in Afghanistan.

U.S. officials, including Panetta, suspect militants from the Haqqani network were behind Tuesday's rocket attack on the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul [nL3E7KE0HW], as well as a truck bomb last Saturday that wounded 77 American forces.

"Time and again we've urged the Pakistanis to exercise their influence over these kinds of attacks from the Haqqanis. And we have made very little progress in that area," Panetta told reporters flying with him to San Francisco.

He added, "I think the message they (the Pakistanis) need to know is: we're going to do everything we can to defend our forces."

Panetta, who was CIA director until July, has long pressed Islamabad to go after the Haqqanis, perhaps the most feared of the Taliban-allied insurgent factions fighting U.S.-led NATO and Afghan troops in Afghanistan.

He declined to answer questions about what steps the United States might take to defend U.S. forces. But Panetta said he was concerned about the Haqqanis' ability to attack American troops and then "escape back into what is a safe haven in Pakistan."

"And that's unacceptable," Panetta said.
[...]
"I'm not going to talk about how we're going to respond. I'll just let you know that we are not going to allow these kinds of attacks to go on," Panetta said.

Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, has long been suspected of maintaining ties to the Haqqani network, cultivated during the 1980s when Jalaluddin Haqqani was a feared battlefield commander against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

While based in Pakistan's North Waziristan area on the Afghan border, Haqqani refrains from attacking the Pakistani state and is seen as a way to maintain Pakistani influence in any future political settlement in Afghanistan.
[...]

September 15:

Islamabad fends off U.S. warning on "Pakistan-based" militants
By Zeeshan Haider
Reuters
3:24am EDT (Eastern Daylight Time)

(ISLAMABAD) Pakistani officials on Thursday fended off a warning that the United States would do whatever it takes to defend U.S. forces from Pakistan-based militants staging attacks in Afghanistan, saying there was no proof of such cross-border operations.
[...]
Pakistani officials said it was the responsibility of U.S.-led forces to crack down on militants when they enter Afghanistan.

"We are using all our resources to fight terrorism. As far as these issues like Haqqani network launching attacks from Pakistani territory is concerned, has any proof ever been given?" said a senior Pakistani military official who asked not to be named.

A senior Pakistani government official involved in defense policy said the South Asian country, reliant on billions of dollars in U.S. aid, was doing all it could to stop militants from crossing the border to Afghanistan.

"But if the militants are doing something inside Afghanistan, then it is the responsibility of the Afghan and Western forces to hold them on the borders," he said.

"They let everyone go scot-free on their side (of the border) and then they say Pakistan is not doing enough."
[...]

Counting on his fingers and toes Bill Roggio figures there are more al Qaeda in Afghanistan than ISAF's official total; Batchelor drops verbal JDAM

ISAF strategy for integrating 'good' Taliban into Afghan government

Over the years Long War Journal's Bill Roggio has tracked the numbers of al Qaeda that ISAF reports killed or captured and compared the numbers with the official NATO count of all al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan then noted that for some strange reason the official total is always the same, year in and year out.

On John Batchelor's May 20 show Roggio again reported on the anomaly and made this observation:

... our top military leaders won't explain how they come up with their estimate of al Qaeda in Afghanistan -- 35 al Qaeda killed last month but the official number hasn't changed ... Al Qaeda has a far wider reach inside Afghanistan than what the US military is saying ...

The dog ate the rest of my notes and I can't remember offhand the exact number ISAF keeps putting out for the grand total but rather than listen to the podcast for the show segment (between 9 and 10 PM) I vaguely recall that the official count is a range, with 50 at the highest end of the range although don't quote me on that.

Meanwhile, over in Nuristan:

Taliban seize district in eastern Afghan province blares a BBC headline today. (H/T John Batchelor Show blog); Batchelor added the snarky comment: "Clearly ready to negotiate?")

I have no idea why the Beeb editor labeled what is clearly Al Qaeda, Inc. as "Taliban" but the reporter, Jill McGivering, manages to convey that the Governor of Nuristan and Afghan security officials are hopping mad at NATO about the situation over there:

Local officials say they are trying to re-take the western district of Doab which Nato denies is in Taliban hands.

At least three districts in Nuristan are now under Taliban control. In others, the government presence is either weak or limited.

"We had intelligence reports that close to 500 Arabs, Chechen, Pakistani and Afghan fighters wanted to attack and take the districts," [Nuristan Governor Jamaludin Badar] told the BBC.
[...]
Afghan intelligence officials in Nuristan say that they have repeatedly warned the government and Nato about the worsening security situation.

"If you don't come and deal with this mess. You will be dealing with another Waziristan and al-Qaeda's next home inside Afghanistan," one official told the BBC.

I will pass lightly over why the Beeb (and the rest of the Western press not to mention ISAF and just about everyone else) continues to insist against all evidence that what is going on in Afghanistan is an "insurgency" IT'S A PROXY WAR MEMO TO WASHINGTON PRESS CORPS HAVE YOU NOTICED THE WAR HAS HEATED UP SINCE PAKISTAN'S MILITARY LEARNED THAT KARZAI WAS GOING AGAINST THEIR 'ADVICE' AND PREPARING TO SIGN A STRATEGIC AGREEMENT WITH THE USA YOU TOADYING WHERE ARE MY SHOES oh that's right I've already thrown every pair at the Washington press corps and must now suffer the indignity of picketing Washington think tanks while shod in bunny slippers where was I?

Returning to al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Long War Journal reported yesterday:

A Moroccan al Qaeda operative who was based in Germany and helped "foreign fighters" enter Afghanistan was captured during a raid in the southeastern Afghan province of Zabul earlier this month. The operative is now providing intelligence on al Qaeda's movements into Afghanistan.
[...]
Several foreign fighters were among those killed during the raid. Security forces "found passports and identification cards from France, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia amongst ten insurgents killed during the operation," ISAF said.
[...]

Ah yes, the Taliban insurgent strongholds in France and Saudi Arabia; silly Pundita not to have noticed how far the borders of Afghanistan stretch.

Here is another LWJ report that should but won't be noted by members of Thinktanistan: ISAF spokesman bungles Haqqani Network's relationship with the Taliban although I think Bill is being charitable or at least circumspect when he calls it a bungle. It's open knowledge that ISAF is desperate to downplay the size of the conglomerate that terms itself "Taliban." Now why is that? Here I pass along some remarks about how the ISAF strategies for dealing with Pakistan and the Taliban are bubbling along:

May 19: Over at Chicago Boyz, the ladylike On Park Street blogger, Doctor Madhu, finally blew a gasket about Washington's deadly policies on Pakistan and Afghanistan and fired off this salvo:

According to Col. Patrick Lang’s site ... Pakistan now has missiles whose range includes Israel. Any of the “checkmating Iran and Russia” geniuses [in Washington] who want to keep Pakistan in the fold thought that through?

She was just getting warmed up.

May 20: Over at the John Batchelor Show blog, Batchelor nonchalantly dropped this verbal JDAM:

USAID is forbidden to build lodgings or in any way assist [Afghans] who want to abandon Taliban and work with the US and international forces. Nonetheless, a 're-integration program' is working excellently in Colombia right now. What are USAID and State doing?

All this is by way of saying that the rumbling you've been feeling under your feet since the raid on Abbottabad is coming from Washington, as thousands of defense lobbyists, opinion experts, policy advisors, congressionals, Pentagon brass and State Department officials scramble to get on the winning side of what Reuters analyst Missy Ryan terms the "Hit Them" vs "Hug Them" debate in Washington about how the U.S. should proceed on Pakistan.

Missy Ryan does not miss much. She does an superb job of summarizing the debate and the "Counterterrorism" vs "Counterinsurgency" sides in the Coalition debate on what to do next in the Afghan War, which flows into the Pakistan debate. However, it would be forlorn hope to look for clarity about how to proceed on Afghanistan or Pakistan among the viewpoints she describes. Ryan is simply chronicling thought processes of people who're trying to save their jobs, political skin or ranking in Washington's policy-establishment pecking order, not any serious considerations about waging the war and dealing with Pakistan.

That's part of the reason ISAF is desperate to downplay the size and makeup of the 'Afghan Taliban.'

To return to Nuristan, a Beeb correspondent stationed in Kabul, Bilal Sawary, added this cheery analysis to accompany McGivering's report:

The fear of Afghan intelligence is that the loss of territory in Nuristan will enable militant groups including the Taliban and al-Qaeda to turn parts of the north-east of Afghanistan in a lawless area similar to North Waziristan in Pakistan.

This will be a huge blow both to the Afghan government and to the US - which has spent millions of dollars on security improvements in the area.

The terrain of the province - mountainous with thick forests - is perfectly suited for insurgent groups who will now be looking to expand their area of operations into neighbouring Laghman province - one hour from Kabul - and the strategically important provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar.
[...]

Have a nice night or day, as the case may be. I'm now headed to Payless to stock up on more shoes to hurl at toads in suits.

Er - sorry to correct The Sun but the talks began when Gordon Brown was PM. Has The Sun forgotten about the Secret Taliban Training Camp Affair?

(For information on the Secret Taliban Training Camp Affair, see May 11 Pundita post, An Irish Shaggy Dog Story, or one of the two reasons the Afghan War has dragged on forever.)

May 23, 2011

UK intel: Taliban won’t make a deal
by Tom Newton Dunn, Political Editor
The Sun (U.K.)

Spy bosses have warned Barack Obama and David Cameron that their secret plan to cut a peace deal with the Taliban is failing.

The PM ordered MI6 to start talks with the fanatics weeks after coming to power a year ago, The Sun can reveal.

He and the US President believe a horse trade with their hated enemy is the only way to end the ten-year war.

But so far, all efforts to bring Taliban chief Mullah Omar and his senior lieutenants to the table have failed - because the Taliban DON'T want to talk.

The highly sensitive issue was thrust back into the limelight by Mr Obama yesterday.

Ahead of his first State visit to Britain tomorrow, the American leader admitted that peace in Afghanistan "ultimately means talking to the Taliban".

Mr Cameron will hold urgent talks with the President on the faltering Afghan exit strategy when they meet at No 10 on Wednesday.

A senior Whitehall official said last night: "MI6 are trying very hard but they are not getting a good response.

"It is very tough. They move one step forward and then two steps back. It's the same with the other countries that are trying."

The official added: "There is a growing consensus that the PM will have to lower our demands significantly before we get anywhere with the Taliban."

A senior US source said: "We are creating the military conditions for talks to happen but we can't find anyone senior enough to talk to.

"It has to be someone with the blessing of Mullah Omar and his cronies. But the message keeps coming back that they are not interested."

Adm. Mullen CYA as Rana prepares to rat out ISI. Meanwhile Rawalpindi rats out Obama and Cameron.

"Adm. Mullen has long been the most outspoken member of the U.S. government in support of Pakistan's military efforts. Adm. Mullen has used his close relationship with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the Pakistani army chief of staff, to prod the military to step up its actions against militants."
- Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2010

On April 20 America's top military officer, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, seemingly turned on a dime. In Pakistan to meet with senior military officials, he told Pakistan's largest-circulation English language newspaper, Dawn:

"It's fairly well known that the ISI has a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani network. Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesn't happen. So that's at the core -- it's not the only thing -- but that's at the core that I think is the most difficult part of the relationship."

Long War Journal's Bill Roggio is skeptical about the strength of Mullen's grasp of the concept of sacred obligation; Bill points out that Mullen had stopped short of addressing the key point, which is that Pakistan's military actively supports the Haqqanis:

"Pakistani officials of course denied supporting the Haqqani Network, and claim they haven't taken on the Haqqani Network due to the focus on the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. This of course is untrue, and Admiral Mullen of course knows that."

Yes. Bill adds: "Despite his 'sacred obligation' to stop US soldiers dying at the hands of Pakistan-backed terror groups, Admiral Mullen cannot bring himself to call Pakistan to account for its actions. And as a result, more US soldiers will die as the dyfunctional 'alliance' between the two nations is nursed along."

True, true, all true; however, that Admiral Mullen would risk the close relationship he's cultivated with General Kayani by publicly uttering an implied criticism of Pakistan's military is an eyebrow raiser; that he did this at the worst juncture in U.S.-Pakistan relations since 2001 and while a guest of Pakistan's government was confounding. (1)

I don't think one has to dig deep for the solution to the mystery. On April 12, the day after ISI head Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha spent four hours dressing down CIA chief Leon Panetta and Admiral Mullen about CIA activities in Pakistan, the Times of India reported that court documents had been made public indicating that a conspirator in the 2008 Mumbai massacre was prepared to rat out the ISI in U.S. courtroom testimony. According to the Times of India:

David Headley aka Daood Gilani and Tahawwur Hussain Rana, the two Pakistani expat footsoldiers who allegedly planned and conducted the Mumbai recce before the 26/11 terrorist carnage, have implicated the Pakistani government and its intelligence agency ISI in the ghastly attack.

In court documents that have surfaced ahead of his upcoming trial in Chicago, Rana says his acts of providing material support to terrorists in the Mumbai attacks as alleged by US prosecutors "were done at the behest of the Pakistani government and the ISI, not the Lashkar terrorist organization."

The documents also cite Rana invoking his friend David Headley's Grand Jury testimony in which the latter too implicates ISI.

A report filed in today's edition of the Asia Times Online about the upcoming trial underscores the seriousness of Rana's claim:

What observers believe could be the most significant outcome of the trial is an irrefutable evidence of ISI complicity. The jury, according to the documents, could have Rana and Headley confess that they were with the Lashkar and the ISI.

Headley has already admitted that he worked for the ISI, but it was a secret testimony heard by a grand jury. "I also told him (Rana) how I had been asked to perform espionage work for the ISI," Headley had reportedly owned up.

Some time ago [Headley] had turned an FBI informer, primarily to escape the electric chair, and at the Chicago hearing he is expected to make a clean breast of his involvement in the Mumbai bloodbath. His anticipated account of the surveillance plan for the Mumbai attacks could lead to clinching proof against Rana.

I interject that the report refers to the ISI as having "alleged" ties with the Pakistani army but that's an error. The ISI is a branch of the military and despite the compartmentalization of the two agencies to provide deniability for the military, the ISI does nothing of substance without the knowledge and orders of the military.

However, the key point is there's clear indication that within a matter of days, when the Rana trial gets underway, the shit is finally going to hit the fan. In my view that means Mullen is scrambling to cover his ass. And if Rana really does sing like a bird, Mullen won't be the only one in Washington scrambling.

Yet to illustrate just how sincere the U.S. military command and the Obama administration are about taking Pakistan's military to task, it surfaced today that under pressure from Rawalpindi the Obama administration had agreed to provide Pakistan's military with 85 'Raven' surveillance drones.

That the drones are small-sized versions of the ones the CIA uses in Pakistan and aren't armed is not the central point. The point is that Pakistan's military doesn't need drones to monitor activities of terror organizations in Pakistan under its control. And in any case it has its own drones -- not as nice as the Ravens but still serviceable. Pakistan's military and ISI want the Ravens to help monitor organizations in Pakistan that are unfriendly to Rawalpindi and to monitor India.

That's not the half of Washington's insincerity. On the same day Mullen was in Pakistan to chastise the ISI the Asia Times Online was reporting:

Pakistan Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani led an unprecedented entourage, including Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani and Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the director general of the Inter-Service Intelligence, to Kabul last week to officially inaugurate the peace reconciliation process with the Taliban under the auspices of Washington and London.

The decision had already been made that the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments will occupy a central role in a reconciliation process that could bring the Taliban into the mainstream Afghan political process.
[...]
There is a long-held understanding within Pakistan's military that any reconciliation process with the Taliban would require a whole package dealing with the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the affiliated group on one side and another with the Western coalition, India and other regional players. The job requires credible leadership.

According to the report's author, Asia Times Pakistan Bureau Chief Syed Saleem Shahzad, the leadership is being supplied by Imran Khan; the report provides considerable detail to explain why this is so and why Khan is the next likely civilian leader of Pakistan.

With some understatement Khan is not U.S.- or NATO-friendly. At the time Shazad filed his report Khan was leading a two-day sit-in outside Peshawar, the capital of northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, "planned for Saturday and Sunday to block supply convoys ferrying goods to North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops in Afghanistan."

Here I'll interject that last year Shahzad's sources inside Pakistan's military allowed him to scoop the rest of the press about the Saudi government's central role in backchannel negotiations between Karzai and the Taliban.

In the wake of Shahzad's bombshell report the negotiations were hotly denied in Kabul and Washington. Then the hotly-denied negotiations were ostentatiously abandoned with much fanfare to the press. But while details of the negotiations that Shahzad recounted sounded like Rawalpindi's wish list, the gist was true as had long been rumored. Many months prior to the Asia Times Online report in 2010, which they published on September 11 as their cute way of twisting the knife, John Batchelor's radio show had mentioned the deep involvement of the Saudi government in backchannel negotiations with the Taliban and Karzai's regime.

I bring up that history to underscore that Shahzad is not sitting around in his office in Islamabad making things up. He has good sources.

Of course one doesn't have good sources inside what's in effect a military dictatorship without acting as a conduit for the regime's propaganda. So elements of Shahzad's latest report, and I think in particular his talk about al Qaeda running rings around the ISAF, can be taken with a grain of salt. Yet even if Pakistan's military is simply using Imran Khan as a pawn in its chess game with the CIA, and even if his report overstates Pakistan's ability to cow Hamid Karzai, Shahzad raises an alarm that should be heeded.

His report as much shouts that Barack Obama and David Cameron are pussyfooting around, this time under cover of the din from Libya, still trying to toss the hot potato of Afghanistan to Rawalpindi.

The only way they could possibly pull off the feat is if Pakistan's military cooperated and put on a show of being a good NATO puppet. The show is threatening to flop before it gets to opening night if Rana spills his guts in a Chicago courtroom. And I think to bring this home to Washington, or maybe in the spirit of revenge, someone in Pakistan's army or ISI decided to point out the tracks of little cat feet.

As to how the pussyfooting helps General David Petraeus persuade Taliban and al Qaeda fighters that there's no use trying to wait out the ISAF, let's ask President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron for the answer.

(1) The Washington Post's David Ignatius, whose opinions in my view track with thinking at the U.S. Department of State, tried to downplay the seriousness of the disagreements between Islamabad and Washington in his April 11 column. But while there was an element of horse-trading in Rawalpindi's high dudgeon about the Raymond Allen Davis Affair and CIA activities in Pakistan, the New York Times report I linked to above, titled, Pakistan Tells U.S. It Must Sharply Cut C.I.A. Activities, is not as overblown as Ignatius portrayed it.

First stop Pakistan military's modus operandi in Afghanistan, then talk to me about defining U.S. success in Afghanistan

The following are comments I entered at SWJ (Small Wars Journal) blog after a reader sent a link to a post there titled Defining Success in Afghanistan and which featured a video of the same title of a panel discussion at American Enterprise Institute. The reader thought that the discussion was worthwhile to note even if one didn't agree with all the opinions expressed by the panelists.

Some of the sources I mentioned in my comments at SWJ would be old news to Pundita readers but this is a good time for a review. I was also struck by a few of the facts cited in the SWJ comments, which I felt were important enough to require clarification or correction. Here I'm not going to name the commenters I addressed at SWJ because that would be unfair; their remarks need to be read in the full context. I'm also going to put the first comment I entered at SWJ last in this post, because it's excerpts from a somewhat lengthy summary of documents that were declassified in 2007. With that introduction out of the way:

I think it's a moot question as to whether the U.S. should stay on in Afghanistan and do nation building. The U.S. military bases being built in Afghanistan -- three at last count, and which are to be reserved for U.S. use -- are just one sign that the Pentagon is planning on being in the country a long time, whether or not there will be extensive drawdowns of combat troops.

I also think it's playing ostrich at this point to argue the questions of whether the U.S. can achieve victory in Afghanistan and what victory might look like. That's because it's obvious by now that until the Pakistan military's modus operandi in Afghanistan is halted NATO is trying to empty the ocean with a sieve and making it impossible for Afghan self-governance.

Just to review: the MO is to use proxies to assassinate or intimidate every Afghan they can manage to neutralize who shows intelligence and skill as an administrator, and who's not corrupt.

That's the same MO the Pakistani military used in East Pakistan and in Kashmir. It's the same MO they used in Baluchistan. It's the same MO they used in Afghanistan after the Russian pullout.

In fact it's the same MO they use against their 'own' people in the Punjab and Sindh who would seriously challenge the power of the country's largest landholders.

So I don't want to hear at this point about paths to victory in Afghanistan and nation building. First replace a sieve with a bucket.

One reason I scared up a summary of those declassified documents [see below] is that their release marked a turning point, in that the U.S. government could no longer practice denial and deception regarding the extent of the involvement of the Pakistan military/ISI with the Taliban.

This has meant that since the release of those documents U.S. officials have had to substitute for denial verbal handsprings; e.g., 'We still believe it's only rogue elements in the ISI,' 'They're improving,' and creative excuses; e.g., 'Remember we need to transport NATO supplies through Pakistan,' but the smoke blowing hasn't fooled any informed observer.

And such excuses won't fool U.S. military servicepeople once they leave Afghanistan and settle into civilian life -- the ones who will steel themselves to dig into the details of the U.S. government's actions toward Pakistan. They may know the big picture [about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship] while in theater but the devil is in the details.

Yet if the U.S. military command sees the lengthening shadow stalking it, it hasn't given a sign of this under Gates's leadership and Mullen's.

Virtual suicide missions, FUBAR orders, and friendly fire are all part of the fabric of war. But I believe that U.S. tolerance for the Pakistan military's use of proxies to murder U.S. troops represents the first time in history that taxpayers are in effect funding the killing and maiming of their own country's finest citizens in order to placate a vaunted ally.

How does the U.S. military high command think that thousands of ex-servicepeople are going to react when they learn in detail of such an atrocity?

So I would be a little less concerned at this point about defining success in Afghanistan and a lot more concerned with halting a betrayal of horrific proportions.

Now to reply to some specific comments:

Regarding the statement, "I understand that role of the Saudi/Pakistan support to the Taliban; however, they didn't support the Taliban when is was Mullah Omar and 5 other guys. [...]"

From yesterday's Guardian report on former ISI spymaster and vaunted "godfather" of the Taliban, Sultan Amir Tarar:

[...] He ran a network of CIA-funded training camps in the tribal belt and Balochistan, which funnelled tens of thousands of mujahideen guerrillas into battle against the Soviets.
[...]
Among his students was a young Afghan cleric named Muhammad Omar ["Mullah Omar"], who emerged as head of the Afghan Taliban and seized power in Kabul in 1996. Tarar played a key role in that movement too.

Operating under diplomatic cover, Tarar was the ISI's point-man with the Taliban, nurturing a relationship in which Pakistan offered arms, advice and finance.

He developed a close personal relationship with Omar and, according to some reports, advised him as US forces attacked Afghanistan in late 2001.
[...]

It was never "Mullah Omar and 5 guys." It was always Pakistan's high military command working in close cooperation with the U.S. command through the ISI front and with financial help and advice from the U.S. and Saudi military and intelligence services.

That's the truth. It is the still the truth, even though Omar and his crew filled a law-and-order vacuum in Afghanistan and thus were tolerated and even welcomed by many Afghans until they recoiled from the Taliban's methods and Saudi-inspired Wahhabist doctrine.

As to the extent to which the U.S. government directly contributed to the indoctrination techniques Tarar used to radicalize Afghan refugees, see the March 2002 Washington Post report, The ABC's of Jihad:

In the twilight of the Cold War, the United States spent millions of dollars to supply Afghan schoolchildren with textbooks filled with violent images and militant Islamic teachings, part of covert attempts to spur resistance to the Soviet occupation.

The primers, which were filled with talk of jihad and featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines, have served since then as the Afghan school system's core curriculum. Even the Taliban used the American-produced books, though the radical movement scratched out human faces in keeping with its strict fundamentalist code.
[...]

Many of those textbooks were used in the madrassas that were set up in refugee camps in Pakistan for Afghan refugees. And just to be clear, those camps were not exclusively reserved for Pashtuns. Afghans from all clans and ethnic backgrounds were given refuge in Pakistan once the Russian military entered Afghanistan.

Regarding the statement, "It was the lack of quality education in the Pashtun regions of Pakistan that provided the demand for the Wahabbism madrassas," that is not entirely correct from my reading of Ahmed Rashid's authoritative history of the Taliban. See pp. 89-90 of his 2001 book, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.

In brief, Rashid recounted that the aim of both the JUI and Zia's military regime in setting up madrassas was to indoctrinate and train Afghan Pashtuns to govern in Afghanistan. Later, as the Pakistani public education system collapsed (or to be more precise, was allowed to collapse), Zia vastly increased the number of madrassas. And yes, those schools became the only source of formal education for many of the poorest Pakistanis, and not just the Pashtuns.

What the passages in the book do not address is why Zia allowed the education system to collapse, despite massive infusions of aid from the West to prop it up. And when I say massive, I mean uncounted USD billions -- so many billions that no one in the 'international community' wants to tot up exactly how many.

This comment section is not the place to explore where successive Pakistani regimes diverted the education aid money to, and why Zia didn't want the country's masses to receive quality public education. But I will say here that it's uniformed to assume that a better education system is the key to turning Pakistanis away from radicalism.

And before I leave the subject of education: it shouldn't be assumed that the madrassas are the sole educational sources of radicalization in Pakistan. Indeed, a Frontline documentary aired a year or so ago featured Pakistani educators pointing out that the greatest radicalizing influence was Pakistan's public schools -- and that in comparison many madrassas were bastions of liberalism.

Thus, only the fact that many Pakistani families can't spare their children for school attendance has prevented an even greater level of radicalization than is seen in today's Pakistan.

Washington D.C., August 14, 2007 - A collection of newly-declassified documents published today detail U.S. concern over Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban during the seven-year period leading up to 9/11.
[...]
[T]he declassified U.S. documents released today clearly illustrate that the Taliban was directly funded, armed and advised by Islamabad itself.

Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive at George Washington University, the documents reflect U.S. apprehension about Islamabad's longstanding provision of direct aid and military support to the Taliban, including the use of Pakistani troops to train and fight alongside the Taliban inside Afghanistan. [Doc 17]

The records released today represent the most complete and comprehensive collection of declassified documentation to date on Pakistan's aid programs to the Taliban, illustrating Islamabad's firm commitment to a Taliban victory in Afghanistan. [Doc 34].

These new documents also support and inform the findings of a recently-released CIA intelligence estimate characterizing Pakistan's tribal areas as a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists, and provide new details about the close relationship between Islamabad and the Taliban in the years prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Declassified State Department cables and U.S. intelligence reports describe the use of Taliban terrorist training areas in Afghanistan by Pakistani-supported militants in Kashmir, as well as Pakistan's covert effort to supply Pashtun troops from its tribal regions to the Taliban cause in Afghanistan-effectively forging and reinforcing Pashtun bonds across the border and consolidating the Taliban's severe form of Islam throughout Pakistan's frontier region.

Also published today are documents linking Harakat ul-Ansar, a militant Kashmiri group funded directly by the government of Pakistan, [Doc 10] to terrorist training camps shared by Osama bin Laden in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. [Doc 16]

Of particular concern was the potential for Islamabad-Taliban links to strengthen Taliban influence in Pakistan's tribal regions along the border. A January 1997 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan observed that "for Pakistan, a Taliban-based government in Kabul would be as good as it can get in Afghanistan," adding that worries that the "Taliban brand of Islam…might infect Pakistan," was "apparently a problem for another day." [Doc 20]
[...]
Islamabad denies that it ever provided military support to the Taliban, but the newly-released documents report that in the weeks following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, Pakistan's intelligence agency was "supplying the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel, and food." Pakistan's Interservice Intelligence Directorate was "using a private sector transportation company to funnel supplies into Afghanistan and to the Taliban forces." [Doc 15]

Other documents also conclude that there has been an extensive and consistent history of "both military and financial assistance to the Taliban." [Doc 8]
[...]
Highlights

> August 1996: Pakistan Intelligence (ISID) "provides at least $30,000 - and possibly as much as $60,000 - per month" to the militant Kashmiri group Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA). Despite this aid, the group is reaching out to sponsors of international terrorism including Osama bin Laden for additional support, and may in the near future become a threat to Islamabad itself as well as U.S. interests. HUA contacts have hinted they "might undertake terrorist actions against civilian airliners." [Doc 10]

> October 1996: A Canadian intelligence document released by the National Security Agency and originally classified Top Secret SI, Umbra comments on recent Taliban military successes noting that even Pakistan "must harbour some concern" regarding the Taliban's impressive capture of Kabul, as such victory may diminish Pakistan's influence over the movement and produce a Taliban regime in Kabul with strong links to Pakistan's own Pashtuns. [Doc 14]

> October 1996: Although food supplies from Pakistan to the Taliban are conducted openly through Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISID, "the munitions convoys depart Pakistan late in the evening hours and are concealed to reveal their true contents." [Doc 15]

> November 1996: Pakistan's Pashtun-based "Frontier Corps elements are utilized in command and control; training; and when necessary - combat" alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. [Doc 17]

> March 1998: Al-Qaeda and Pakistan government-funded Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA) have been sharing terrorist training camps in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for years [Link Doc 16], and HUA has increasingly been moving ideologically closer to al-Qaeda. The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad is growing increasingly concerned as Fazlur Rahman Khalil, a leader in Pakistan's Harakat ul-Ansar has signed Osama bin Laden's most recent fatwa promoting terrorist activities against U.S. interests. [Doc 26]

> September 1998 [Doc 31] and March 1999 [Doc 33]: The U.S. Department of State voices concern that Pakistan is not doing all it can to pressure the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden. "Pakistan has not been responsive to our requests that it use its full influence on the Taliban surrender of Bin Ladin." [Doc 33]

> September 2000: A cable cited in The 9/11 Commission Report notes that Pakistan's aid to the Taliban has reached "unprecedented" levels, including recent reports that Islamabad has possibly allowed the Taliban to use territory in Pakistan for military operations. Furthermore the U.S. has "seen reports that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding, technical assistance and military advisors." [Doc 34]"

For the entire summary and links to all the documents cited, see this page at the GW University archives website.

The ghost

The problem for Obama, Mullen, Gates, Clinton, Petraeus and all their advisors is that they cannot comprehend what life was like for Pakistan's ruling families during the British Raj. There's no use trying to explain what it was like because they will interrupt and say, 'I know.' They know nothing and understand even less. They have their heads stuffed with postcolonial theories thought up by leftists such as Edward Said and guilt-ridden Britons.

But if you saw James Cameron's Titanic and recall the scene in the flooded grand ballroom with drowned passengers in elegant evening attire, you might intuit a little of what it was like for those families. It was all swept away after World War Two, a way of life Pakistan's ruling families thought would never end.

Westerners must accept that they can't fully understand what was lost. It might surprise you to learn that the Indians can't fully understand, either. That's because Indians can't imagine how it feels to realize one has traded everything of lasting value for a mirage.

The true Pakistan is a ghost, a ghost of the British Empire at its most glorious.

Westerners can understand, I think, what the most informed Indians already know: that without the help of the ruling families who supported the British enterprise in India the British couldn't have lasted there as long as they did. The ruling families were the British Raj. So it was a symbiotic relationship, not a parent-child one, a relationship that created a lifestyle of timeless order.

The order was an illusion, just as an unsinkable ship is an illusion, but that was seen only when the British could no longer afford to maintain the illusion. Yet the illusion was so powerful that Pakistan's rulers didn't see Partition as abandoning the motherland: they would go on ruling, as they had always done, and the mighty British Empire would continue to remain their protector. The second great European war was a blip, as the first great European war had been; the British would bounce back and everything would continue as before.

When the illusion vanished Pakistan's ruling families were left with the outward forms, the mannerisms of Pax Britannica: cricket matches, marching bands, a patronizing contempt for Hindus, high tea. That's what they gave up the motherland for and they know it. That's why it could take Pakistan's ruling families another generation before they're able to let go of a past that is more real to them than anything around them today.

However, Afghans and the NATO countries don't have a generation to wait for the balm of time to exorcise a ghost. For that reason the NATO military command and its civilian bosses need to cease trying to reform, advise, or otherwise guide the Pakistanis. Instead, they need to buckle down to the task of persuading Afghans that the Westerners leading the war in Afghanistan aren't barking mad.

I myself, being a Westerner, find nothing strange about people who change their mind every 15 minutes; I think of it simply as either a lack of focus or being data-driven in one's decision-making processes. But the NATO leaders must allow that some people do consider the trait a sign of insanity. That perception is now the greatest obstacle NATO faces in Afghanistan.

Photograph: "A boy uses cream on his face as he sits in rain water on a street in Karachi, July 27, 2010" from Pakistan through the eyes of Reuters - a gallery of Reuters news photos published in collaboration with Pakistan's Dawn newspaper.

OSCE's backdoor attempt to influence Thailand's election and why Americans should take note

OSCE Permanent Council

[Flipping her pen in the air] Can't I go on vacation for a few weeks without the cockroaches running riot in Washington? Never mind; it's a rhetorical question.

Actually the OSCE machinations with Thaksin Shinawatra started before my vacation but the situation flew under my radar until some nice person decided to ruin my holiday by alerting me.

The story is that the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) invited Thaksin to Washington to testify on human rights violations in Thailand and specifically during the Red Shirt 'riots' this Spring. (See Asia Sentinel report via Irrawaddy , December 15, "Thaksin goes to America.")

Pundita readers might recall what I and the rest of the outside world went through in the effort to get a fix on what was really happening in Bangkok during the riots. It turned out the riots were street theater that masked a sophisticated 5GW-type operation to destabilize Thailand's government, and which pointed to Thaksin as the mastermind.

That's not even addressing Thaksin's alleged human rights abuses and strong-arm tactics while he served as Thailand's prime minister.

In short, asking Thaksin to hold forth on human rights abuses and authoritarian trends in Thailand's government is asking the fox to point out weaknesses in the chicken coop. Despite this, the OSCE decided to give Thaksin a big public platform in Washington at a most sensitive juncture in Thailand's politics. (AFP report today, "Thai PM faces key electoral test in 2011.")

It's possible Thaksin's visa application to enter the USA will be denied, given the terrorism charges against him in Thailand. And his planned appearance in December has been postponed until January, ostensibly because Congress will be in session then, but probably in response to howls of protest from Thailand's government and various quarters in Washington. (The Straits Times, December 13 report, "Thaksin's US Hearing Put Off;" December 7 VOA report, "Thailand May Seek Extradition of Thaksin If He Enters US.")

Yet in light of Thaksin's spotty human rights record while he was PM, and given the great importance of the present Thai administration's assistance to Washington in the war on terror -- assistance which included their part in a sting operation that netted Viktor Bout -- one has to wonder about the backstory to the OSCE decision to call Thaksin to testify.

The Bout arrest is notable in this context because of alleged attempts by some of his buddies in the Russian mobs to bribe Thai officials -- a story that came to public view light in a Wikileaks leaked U.S. State Department cable. (Dec 1 AFP
report)

However, I think the real backstory is the story of the OSCE itself, what it's become since the mid-1990s. (See Wikipedia article on the organization in particular the Criticisms section.)

The larger story is what U.S. foreign policy has become since the mid-1990s. President Bill Clinton's administration was so tilted toward the EU it's not much of an exaggeration to say that during the Clinton era U.S. foreign policy was run from a postbox in Brussels when it wasn't run from London.

Add to this foreign lobbies, U.S. domestic defense lobbies, and U.S. domestic lobbies with foreign agendas have become such a huge industry in Washington since the 1990s that the USA doesn't have a foreign 'policy' anymore. It has thousands of competing interests, which pull members of Congress, key government agencies and the presidential administration in a thousand different directions. That's not policy. That's The Blob.

And the OSCE, a United Nations-chartered organization that is today the world's largest security-oriented intergovernmental organization, is very much a part of the blob. I guess one benefit is that all these European organizations keep the manufacturers of large mahogany tables in business. And I really do applaud the European Union; I am so happy the West Europeans are not always warring with each other anymore.

But it's like ex-smokers who chew gum incessantly: they seem to have replaced battles with councils, which proliferate at an ever-increasing rate. And that's okay for the Europeans, as long as they're happy. But America is not the Roman Empire. It's not the British Empire. And if we don't want to go the way of those empires, we need to stop with our attempts to imitate the Europeans, else we'll be destroyed by the blob, which at last count was ten zillion lobbies, agencies, and NGOs.

And we need to stuff our ears with cotton whenever the EU tells Americans that we must be involved in their way of doing things because the USA is a superpower nation. Seems to me the Europeans are telling every nation it needs to be involved in the EU's way of doing things. The problem is that the European Union is not a nation. It's the world's most powerful trading bloc.

I'm not going to sit here and say that the OSCE has given every sign that it's morphed into yet one more front organization for the European Union. Vladimir Putin has already said it for me. (See Wikipedia's article on the OSCE.) I will say that the OSCE has no business trying to manipulate America's relationship with Thailand and to compound their sneakiness by doing this behind the American public's back.

Before I return to my vacation I will also note that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's idea is to get the OSCE even more involved in security for Afghanistan. (See December 1 Bloomberg report.) For the love of sanity: we need fewer outside agencies in Afghanistan and less OSCE involvement because with every additional layer of bureaucracy that's imported, this only adds to the corruption and the confusion in the country. But then everyone at State already knows this.

Richard Holbrooke's surgery: Once again the hand of fate intervenes in Afghan War, and the tale of a matchmaker and the attention-deficit client

UPDATE
From Reuters report 8 PM ET: Holbrooke, 69 years old, underwent another procedure on Sunday to improve his circulation and remains in critical condition, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said in a statement.
*************

The matchmaker (with Cupid's bow and arrow)

The Associated Press reported this morning that Richard Holbrooke, special U.S. envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, is in stable but critical condition after more than 20 hours of surgery to repair a torn aorta. The report also mentioned that even if the recovery goes well it is likely it will be a lengthy process. As to how this will affect the Afghan war situation, from the report:

[...] Holbrooke's illness comes just days before the Obama administration is expected to roll out the results of its review of the Afghanistan war next Thursday. His illness is unlikely to result in any changes in that review in which the diplomat has played an integral role.
[...]
But Holbrooke's prolonged absence could have an impact on the administration's ability to implement — and also sell to a skeptical Congress — its push for Afghan forces to assume a greater role in the fighting, allowing U.S. troops to come home. It is a transition in which Holbrooke was expected to play an important part, since he has made many visits to the region and developed personal relationships with leaders in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
[...]

I am thinking back to the eruption of a volcano in Iceland and how in a way no one could have foreseen this changed the course of the war in Afghanistan. If not for an ash cloud from the volcano that hovered over Western Europe's airports it's likely that Gen. Stanley McChrystal would be still be in command of ISAF.

One might argue that Gen. David Petraeus has only continued the counterinsurgency plan that McChrystal was carrying out but Petraeus can do what McChrystal couldn't, which is to change his mind about facts on the ground and make sweeping changes in response. Already Petraeus has added several counterterrorism tactics to the POPCOIN (population-centric counterinsurgency or COIN) plan and he won't hesitate to keep adjusting tactics and even allover strategy in the effort to pull a win out of Afghanistan.

As for Holbrooke, Petraeus has referred to him as his 'wingman.' But despite Holbrooke's vast experience as a negotiator, I think it's been terribly unhelpful to have a wingman who confuses South Asia with Eastern Europe and Afghanistan with Bosnia. Perhaps a lengthy recovery period or retirement for Holbrooke will cause Petraeus to cast around for a wingman who sees Pakistan as Pakistan and Afghanistan as Afghanistan. Now that would be progress. As to where we are now: in the same rut we've been in for years. At the end of July, in the wake of the first round of leaked Wikileaks documents, Ahmed Rashid reported for the (U.K.) Spectator what was already plain as day:

[...] A few months ago Hamid Karzai would have been thrilled to have confirmation that American officers are speaking openly about how divisions of Pakistani intelligence are helping the Taleban. But after spending eight years criticising the ISI, he recently decided to cosy up to them.

Karzai seems to have given up on the ability of the Americans, the Brits and Nato either to defeat the Taleban or even to talk to them. This is why he has turned to Pakistan and Iran: his own freelance attempt to try to broker a ceasefire with the Taleban which would involve a power-sharing deal.[...]

I disagree with this view. From all I've seen I think it was initially Western European governments in NATO, with the USA eventually joining in, which put pressure on Karzai to open up negotiations with the Taliban; when he didn't move in that direction strongly enough some NATO governments took matters into their own hands. Recall the secret British deal to set up Taliban training camps that Karzai's security force uncovered.

But Rashid is correct in that by this year Karzai had put more effort into forging better relations with Pakistan -- as if he had choice when confronted with the threat of the U.S. quitting Afghanistan in 2011.

Rashid was also on the money in his summation of Asfaq Kayani's role in the situation:

These [Wikileaks] leaks are highly embarrassing for Pakistan’s President, Asif Zardari, who has just cravenly given in to the army and awarded a three-year extension to its chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani. [Kiyani] ran the ISI between late 2004 and 2007 and had been director of its military operations before that. Both jobs involved helping and sustaining the Taleban in exile in Pakistan, and facilitating their revival in 2004-05.

It was Kiyani who formulated the policy that is criticised in the leaks: giving the Taleban sanctuary and support. The last thing Zardari wants is a forced confrontation with the army over these leaks.

Kiyani is now the most powerful man in Pakistan and will remain army chief until 2013. His aim is for the Americans, the Brits and the Afghans to open talks with Taleban leaders — who are all in Pakistan and over whom the ISI has a great deal of influence and control. In return, Kiyani wants to make sure that the ISI brokers any such talks — and is able to advance its own national security interests. At the top if its wish list is securing a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul, and ending what he regards as too much Indian influence in Afghanistan. This is why the leaked emails [published by Wikileaks] come at a bad time for Kiyani: the last thing he needs right now is any embarrassment about his role, or that of the ISI, in the past.

Kayani needn't have worried about being embarrassed because Richard Holbrooke ably covered for him in public as did Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. As to whether Holbrooke did the same in private discussions: no one held a gun to his head to make him forcefully represent in public a policy toward Pakistan that was suicidal for ISAF forces and a death knell for Afghanistan. So whatever he said in private is beside the point.

The great tragedy is that NATO's view, backed to the hilt by Mullen and rubber-stamped by the Obama administration and Holbrooke, made it impossible for any intelligent assessment to gain ground on how the U.S. should deal with Pakistan.

But that's because the Afghan War is the ADD war; I was reminded of that the other night when I caught an episode of Bravo TV's reality show Millionaire Matchmaker. The show is about a third-generation matchmaker (Patti Stanger) who along with her team of assistants makes matches for millionaires who have everything in life except a spouse. I don't follow the show as much as I'd like to find time for, but every time I've seen it I have been regaled and instructed by the matchmaker's shrewd observations about her picky clients.

The girl (or guy, in the case of a female millionaire) of the millionaires' dreams turns out not to exist for many of the clients simply because no sane person except a gold-digger would date them more than once, let alone marry them. Thus, the delight of the show is Stanger's attempts to help jerks transform themselves into dating material.

One such client was described by the matchmaker's assistant as having ADD (Attention Deficit Disorder) as they settled in to study the video he made to introduce himself to Stanger.

When the matchmaker said at first that she didn't see the ADD, the assistant replied, "Wait."

It wasn't a long wait. The man seeking help was unable to focus on his request or on anything outside his business -- his attention split between his Blackberry and laptop.

Happily he was desperate for a good mate, so desperate that he took the matchmaker's advice to put away all the tools of his trade while on a date and focus on the girl. With his attention thus gathered he turned out to be an engaging date.

Would that for a few weeks the matchmaker could take charge of those in charge of the Afghan War. I feel sure she would find a way to get across to even the most scattered brains that it's not possible to win a war if it's always seen as something else; if every tactic is filtered through a geopolitical situation that is not centered in Afghanistan.

Amrullah Saleh sets the record straight on Taliban imposter, and the question that haunts

Of course this report got no play in the USA:

Taliban impostor warnings ignored by Afghan leaders, says former spy chief
by Jon Boone
(U.K.) Guardian, November 28, 2010

Desperate for a peace deal with the Taliban, officials dismissed security advice over bogus go-between

Hamid Karzai's desperation for a "Good Friday agreement for Afghanistan" led officials to ignore repeated warnings from their own spy chief that they should not trust a man who orchestrated a humiliating face-to-face meeting between the Afghan president and a shopkeeper who pretended to be the Taliban's second most powerful leader.

Amrullah Saleh, the former head of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghanistan's equivalent of MI5, said his agency first vetted the man, who claimed to be a representative of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, one of the highest-ranking figures in the Taliban, in mid-2008, but rejected him after he was unable to prove his credentials.

However, the go-between, who said he was a Taliban leader from Kandahar called Muhammad Aminullah, subsequently approached the interior minister, Hanif Atmar, the following year and was enthusiastically embraced by an Afghan government desperate for a breakthrough in peace talks.

Saleh, a highly regarded administrator who was sacked by Karzai earlier this year, said all his warnings were ignored. "I tried time and again to convince my colleagues in the ministry and subsequently at the palace that he is not a genuine representative of anybody," he told the Observer.

The rare public statement by Afghanistan's former top spy contradicted attempts yesterday by the Afghan government to deny that "Mansour" had ever held high-level meetings in Kabul. It also further undermines claims by the Afghan government that MI6 was entirely to blame for the fiasco. [...]

There's more in the report that calls for close attention but I want to turn now to another report, one that throws additional light on Saleh's trials as he tried to talk sense into men pursuing a mirage.

Note the date of the cable under discussion in the following report: January of this year. Yet at that time (and up to this day) there were elements in Washington, including elements in the U.S. military, which continued to insist that Pakistan's military command and ISI had turned over a new leaf. The willful blindness of these factions led the Obama administration to push for an equally blind pursuit of reconciliation with the Taliban.

The question that haunts me is just how far the U.S. is willing to go in the attempt to discredit Karzai's warnings about the intentions of Pakistan's military. I suspect it's a question that also haunts Karzai -- and Saleh:

Pak Army and ISI continue to support Afghan Taliban: Karzai

Press Trust Of India
December 3, 2010

(Washington) Over a month after the new Af-Pak policy was unveiled, Afghan President Hamid Karzai warned the US that no success could be achieved in the war against terrorism [while] the Pakistan Army and ISI continued to support Afghan Taliban. Welcoming a delegation of US lawmakers, including Republican John McCain, Karzai told them that the improvement in the overall bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan was held back by the Army and ISI who continue to help the Afghan Taliban.

This was written by US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry ... in a secret cable dated January 10, 2010, which was released by WikiLeaks. President Barack Obama unveiled his Af-Pak policy in December, 2009. The United States, which has charged the Wikileaks of indulging in a criminal act by stealing and releasing these cables, has neither confirmed nor denied the authenticity of these documents.

Karzai said he wants to engage more and have US support in doing so, since "the war won't end easily without Pakistani cooperation", the cable said.

"He was pessimistic about the internal situation, as was his intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh. Saleh noted that Pakistan's energy sector was in decline and that discontent in Pashtun areas was higher than it had been in the volatile 1960s and 1970s," the cable said.

Karzai also said his Pakistani counterpart Asif Ali Zardari is using Baloch nationalists as his base of support. "Saleh predicted that neither the army nor Nawaz Sharif would bring Zardari's term to an abrupt end," the Ambassador wrote.

Explaining his reintegration approach, Karzai noted that the peace process and reintegration efforts help in the fight against the Taliban by working with those who are willing to come back, especially the "foot soldiers".

Reconciliation would extend to more senior level Taliban (not Mullah Omar, he clarified) who are not linked to Al Qaeda, "some of whom are willing" to talk. Lots of contacts are taking place, Karzai said, but no common reconciliation policy has emerged, the cable said.

"McCain noted that for this to be successful the other side should be convinced they can't win and this should probably be timed to work with the new influx of troops now underway.

"He agreed that those fighting for reasons other than ideology should be helped to return and that the fight should continue against the ideologically-motivated Taliban, stressing the importance of educating the country that both efforts were ongoing at the same time," the cable said.

Wikileaks plus first disbursements from 2009 US aid bill for Pakistan already under scrutiny for graft. Senator Richard Lugar please take note.

December 4 UPDATE
Last week Michael Wright prodded and poked Pundita into explaining, in paint-by-numbers fashion, how ISAF can wrest a real victory in Afghanistan and why the best approach the USA can take to Pakistan is as little as possible. See the forthcoming post -- working title: What would Genghis Khan do? How ISAF can beat the enemy in Afghanistan. The post will be published whenever I finish transcribing and editing the conversation, which I hope will be sometime on Sunday, December 5.

Anti-American rally in Peshawar, October 7, 2009

(Reuters photograph)

The On Park Street blogger, posting yesterday at Chicago Boyz, reported learning from Senator Richard Lugar's website that in his capacity as the ranking Republican Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee he "exercised close oversight of U.S. policy in Pakistan and participated in more than 15 hearings related to ongoing affairs in the country from 2003 to the present."

The Wikipedia article on Lugar mentions that he along with Senator Joseph Biden, his Democrat counterpart on the committee, were awarded the Hilal-i-Pakistan (Crescent of Pakistan) Award from the government of Pakistan "for their continued support of the country." Given all the billions USD that Lugar and Biden (the original co-sponsors of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009) were proposing to throw at Pakistan on top of the $15billion in aid heaped on it since 2001, one might have hoped the award was accompanied by a brass band and a banquet.

But no; news of the planned aid package ($7.5 billion to be dispersed over 5 years to civilian projects) was met with a chorus of fears in Pakistan that the United States was trying to direct the country's internal affairs. This built to such an outpouring of anti-Americanism on the Pakistan Street and to such umbrage among Pakistan's Parliamentarians that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee scrambled to debunk any and all possible fears in Pakistan that the United States wanted anything for its aid beyond to helpful. When that assurance seemed to have no effect the sponsors of the aid bill, including Senator Lugar, heaped clarifications on top of explanations:

“The legislation does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan’s national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations.”

However, the displays of injured pride, the street theater, the entire show, was just another day's work of haggling at the bazaar, a clever propaganda campaign mounted by Pakistan's Army Chief of Staff General Ashfaq Kayani -- or as unsporting Americans might term it, a scam:

November 30, 2010, Dawn

(Karachi) The whistle-blower website Wikileaks released sensitive documents alleging that the Pakistan’s army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s opposition led to the conflict on the Kerry-Lugar Bill as it was going to result in greater civilian control on the military, DawnNews reported. [...] According to the released documents, General Kayani has learnt from the mistakes made by former military ruler Pervez Musharraf. He is using the parliament and the government while staying in the background, the documents allege. [...]

Now here a reasonable person might ask why Lugar et al. were taken in, given the intell available to them through the diplomatic dispatch on Kayani's moves. For the answer, watch carefully, don't blink:

From John Batchelor's notes on his interview last night with U.S. House of Representatives Rep. Pete Hoekstra, who is a Ranking Member on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:

In re: WikiLeaks - why was a private first class [Bradley Manning] with no known worth in connection with State, sitting in Baghdad, able to access information that was way, way over his responsibility?

See John Fund's article in WSJ on Tuesday [Hoekstra on Wikileaks: 'Across the Board Neglect']. Government got lazy after 9/11 by expanding a DoD database named SIPRNet to accommodate more info sharing: State, DoD, CI: 500,000 people in or connected to the Executive had access - but it was all denied to Congress, including to Rep Hoekstra in Yemen on 1 Jan 2010 ("Sorry, we can't tell you on orders from the White House.")

Now it's all in WikiLeaks and the entire planet has it. Extremely insulting, and dangerous to the American people.

Review: ranking member of House Intell Committee flew to Yemen for real-time info on US policy; was refused; data were that AQAP was bombing and it was being disguised as Yemeni activity. [John Batchelor's comment] To deny the people is to deny the democracy.

By the "the people" John means not the public but the representatives of the American people, the Congress.

If you're having a hard time wrapping your mind around the concept that vital information would be withheld from key congressional defense/intelligence committees -- which can't make informed recommendations without such data -- while thousands of low-level civilian government and military employees had access to the data, you should listen to the interview; it's enough to make your blood boil if you're an American. Here is the link to the WABC-77 radio podcast of the interview, which is about 10 minutes in length. (You can also download the interview; see the WABC archive page for the John Batchelor Show, 10 PM segment, Monday.)

So the bizarre way in which access to the diplomatic dispatches was meted out helped blind U.S. decision-makers just as surely as turf-protecting at government agencies had done in earlier years -- a problem that the shared network was meant to solve! That, I submit, is the biggest surprise to emerge thus far from the Wikileaks documents dump.

Yet the revelation doesn't fully explain why the U.S. military and executive and congressional branches have consistently made bad calls on Pakistan because this has been going on for more than a half century -- ever since the U.S. first became involved with Pakistan. Yet these bad calls weren't seen as such until NATO floundered in Afghanistan. That finally put a crimp in the style of Washington's anti-Russia crowd but over decades the crowd and its counterpart in Europe looked the other way while Pakistan ran riot because they saw the country as a weapon first against the Soviet Union then against Russia.

Joe Biden, the original co-sponsor of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, has always been part of the 'Get Russia' contingent in official Washington. I am not sure about Lugar. But one only needs to read his profile at Wikipedia or the transcript of his recent discussion at the Council of Foreign Relations, to see how he has prioritized his work on defense threats during his decades in Washington. This observation isn't a criticism of his focus on securing Russian nukes and reducing the number of nuclear weapons but that area of defense is clearly his greatest area of expertise, not Pakistan.

Lugar's situation is the story of all U.S. Members of Congress; they are pulled in several directions, so it's always a great accomplishment when a congressional can become expert in just one area of policy. That, plus the hyphenated aspect of how Washington perennially views Pakistan has meant there are no Pakistan experts in the Washington policy establishment. It's never been "Pakistan" in Washington's view. It's been Pakistan-Cold War, Pakistan-Afghanistan, Pakistan-Russia, Pakistan-War on Terror -- and since 2009, Pakistan-India.

The upshot was clear in Lugar's wide-ranging discussion at CFR and the questions that were put to him. He made only a glancing mention of Pakistan:

Where is our aid money going? How are we effecting these changes in Afghanistan that we want with regard to children or women or everybody who has been in the dispossessed category? And the -- those are going to be more and more difficult issues to answer.

It's the same over on the Pakistani side.

You know, I've -- my name is attached -- first of all it was the Biden-Lugar bill, then it became the Kerry-Lugar bill, then the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. But in any event, the excitement of Pakistan at the time was that $1.5 billion would be allocated to Pakistan for a five-year period.

And that was magic, five years; the thought was we'd always leave by the end of five months. But we would be committed to thinking through the basic institutions of the country for that period of time.

However, as Secretary Clinton found when she went over, many of the military people in Pakistan took a very dim view of that, and they said, you're beginning to get into our territory of decision-making. And so now most of them have relented.

But the facts of life are that very little of the first 1.5 billion (dollars) has been spent, for the first year. And some of it has been suggested for the flood relief.

The Pakistanis have said, no, we really want to do the schools and the basic institutions; let's have some other money for the flood. Well, fair enough, but any money getting there that is -- that is supervised, that has some credibility with regard to American taxpayers as to how it's being spent, is sort of hard to come by.

Two months after his remarks came the news that even the first small disbursements were already in trouble due to charges of corruption. Because aid monies disbursed to the Pakistani government become the sovereign property of the government and thus immune to oversight the 2009 aid bill aimed to get around the problem by disbursing the money to NGOs. The workaround simply opened another avenue for graft:

Probe into Kerry-Lugar funds' embezzlement by NGOs in Pakistan
Source: IANS via Sify
Nov 25, 2010

Islamabad, Nov 25 (IANS) Pakistan's National Accountability Bureau (NAB) has decided to investigate reports of alleged corruption in the funds being disbursed to NGOs for development projects under the Kerry-Lugar bill.

A two-member delegation of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) met NAB chairman Justice (retd.) Deedar Hussain Shah Thursday and 'requested him to look into the matter to ensure transparency in the development schemes aimed for the betterment of Pakistan people'.

The US government has already lodged formal complaints with NAB regarding financial embezzlement in local NGOs and the association of some US nationals with them. Justice Shah assured the US officials that "complaints will be thoroughly investigated and accused will be brought to book".

The Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, signed by US President Barack Obama in October 2009, envisions providing non-military financial assistance worth $7.5 billion to Pakistan in five years. Much of this aid was to disburse through American NGOs for development projects at mass level in Pakistan.

There have been reports that some local NGOs have used US citizens as front men while some others have pooled with the non-governmental organizations in US to squeeze funding. This is against the spirit of the funding agreement and prompted the US authorities to lodge complaints for a formal probe.

Now I'm not going to sit here for another year on this blog and keep finding different ways to give the same recommendation. If Washington can't fathom the reasons for the simple injunction, "Stay out of the bazaar," then bitter experience will continue to be the only teacher of the American military and civilian government.

From queries I've received the cognitive stumbling block about my advice seems to be that tending to one's own business can't be that simple a solution to the Afghan War. It is that simple. If you need to get from New York to Boston in the fastest possible time, do you route your trip through Bangkok? If you need to go buy milk and bread, do you head for an electronics store? Some do such things; some have great difficulty focusing on any one task. But such people should not be involved in war planning nor in the diplomatic exchanges that support it.

Yes, the world could come to an end if something isn't done about Pakistan and yes, al Qaeda is holed up there. But this has nothing to do with the USA -- or NATO -- fighting the war in Afghanistan. The refrain is, 'But what'll we do if Pakistan won't let us bring our supplies through the country?'

I can't imagine Pakistan's military voluntarily giving up the revenue but if the unthinkable happens what you'll do is cross that bridge when you come to it. That's how one gets a task done. If Pakistan's military jacks up their price, figure on what you can afford and if the cost is too high tell them, 'I guess that means we'll have to ask Afghan tribes to teach our soldiers to live off the land. And we'll have to cut down on the supplies we order and the number of troops we've deployed.'

That's all; make do with what's available instead of creating a veritable universe of distractions that only cause the years and the body bags to pile up.

If ISAF can't invade Pakistan, then al Qaeda on their side of the border is the Pak military's problem; the ISAF problem is to pick off al Qaeda when they step across the Pak border.

If Pakistan's government invites ISAF in; if they allow it to fight battles against al Qaeda and give it all necessary help, that's a different story. Otherwise, ISAF should focus on plugging up the holes. Al Qaeda will not spend weeks clambering over remote mountain passes just to blow up a few Coalition soldiers; al Qaeda and Taliban fighters are driving through the border checkpoints, not playing Sherpa.

And the USA should lavish all the attention it's been giving Pakistan on Afghanistan instead. That's how the U.S. military will win hearts and minds: just do your job, the one you told the Afghans you were going to do. That's all.

There is another way to play it, but that way is not open to Washington because the policy establishment doesn't understand the Pakistanis and has no interest in understanding them. There is no simpatico -- and that's okay because the USA is in that part of the world to fight a war. It stops being okay when Washington tries to beat the Pakistanis at games Americans don't understand. It stops being okay when Americans patronize them. It stops being okay when Americans try to strategize outside their experience.

Now do you want to see where all the U.S. machinations have led; what the U.S. has accomplished with Pakistan's military command? For all the money spent, all the time invested, all the carrots and sticks, Washington has accomplished nothing. Kayani has not budged from his views, and one doesn't need to be logged onto SIPRNet to learn this; just look at today's issue of Dawn. To return to the report about Kayani and Wikileaks:

[...] The correspondence [from Jasmine Zerinini, Adviser on international and strategic affairs to the Permanent Secretary for National Defence in the French Cabinet] sheds light on the Pakistan Army’s policies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata).
[...]
[Kayani] is becoming an obstacle to any major change in the country’s policy pertaining to Fata.

Zerinini’s correspondence also stated that the West has lost the opportunity to crush the Afghan Taliban with Pakistan’s help.

The correspondence stated that with aid coming in from the Gulf States, the Haqqani network has grown too strong, that defeating it will not be easy for the Pakistani military. [...]

And from another report in today's issue of Dawn (the unnamed senior military official is Kayani, who is also the de facto ruler of Pakistan at this time):

Pakistan the "most bullied US ally"
By Cyril Almeida

RAWALPINDI: On the day WikiLeaks released a slew of American diplomatic cables revealing, among other things, tensions between the US and Pakistan over nuclear matters, a top Pakistani military official claimed the country “has transited from the `most sanctioned ally` to the `most bullied ally`” of the US.

The comments were part of a wide-ranging briefing given to editors, anchors and columnists on Sunday. The timing of the briefing appeared to be a coincidence, having been scheduled before the WikiLeaks information became public. All comments were made strictly on the condition of anonymity being maintained.

Detailing frank exchanges between the uppermost echelons of the Pakistan military and the Obama administration, the senior military official listed a catalogue of complaints the `people of Pakistan` have against the US.

These include: the US still has a `transactional` relationship with Pakistan; the US is interested in perpetuating a state of `controlled chaos` in Pakistan; and, perhaps most explosively given the WikiLeaks` revelations, the “real aim of US strategy is to de-nuclearise Pakistan”.

The official also repeatedly stressed that the `frames of reference` of the US and Pakistan with regard to regional security matters “can never be the same and this must be acknowledged”. Furthermore, the official claimed, the dichotomy between short-term US interests and long-term Pakistani security interests needs to be kept in mind at all times.

When asked about the outlook for relations between the US and Pakistan in the year ahead, the military commander gave a downbeat assessment: “I see difficulties and pitfalls. Things are so complex (in the region).”

On Afghanistan, the official suggested the Americans need to “clearly identify and state the end conditions in Afghanistan”. The commander also claimed the lack of clarity on the Americans` part was because “either they aren`t willing to state them (the desired `end conditions`) or they don`t know themselves”.

Giving a personal assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, the senior official suggested what is needed in the neighbouring country is a “minimum agenda with broad public support”.

Elaborating on that minimum agenda, the official said there “are indicators that the parties to the conflict in Afghanistan can renounce Al Qaeda and ask it to leave Afghanistan”.

Stressing that in Afghanistan the “peace may never be complete, there may be no permanent stability and uncontested power may never establish itself”, the official suggested a minimalist, three-step sequential process towards a “peaceful and stable” Afghanistan.

First, violence in Afghanistan will need to be brought down, and for this “some concessions may have to be made”. Next, all parties would have to renounce Al Qaeda. And finally, some kind of consensus on a future Afghan constitution would have to be negotiated keeping in mind the “history, culture and geography” of the country.

The official rejected the possibility of Pakistan intensifying efforts to interdict militants crossing into Afghanistan: “If we have to look after the border as well as settled areas, the valleys (in the tribal areas), well, that`s mutually exclusive…. Helmand and Kandahar are hundreds of kilometres from the (Pak-Afghan) border. Kabul is far away from North Waziristan. If they (troops in Afghanistan) want to catch them, why don`t they?”

The senior army official had harsh comments for the Afghan government. Recounting the frequent Afghan accusations against this country — Pakistan is keeping the Taliban as `an option`; Pakistan is `shielding the Quetta Shura`; Pakistan is `harbouring and supporting the Haqqanis`, etc — the senior officer responded with a list of Pakistani grievances.

“Pakistan is deliberately being kept in the dark regarding peace efforts…. Pakistan has suffered because of Afghanistan the most…. Many Afghans in leadership role continue to hold malice against Pakistan,” the official claimed.

However, the official added “the bottom line is, destinies of Pakistan and Afghanistan are intertwined and must be seen as one…. An early end to conflict in Afghanistan is key to Pakistan.”

Inevitably, India featured in the comments on both Afghanistan and the US.

Regarding Afghan-India relations, the official said, “Pakistan has no right or desire to dictate Afghanistan`s relations with any country, including India. But Pakistan expects Afghanistan will be mindful of legitimate security concerns (of Pakistan).”

On the triangle of US-Pak-India relations, the commander had this to offer: “The people of Pakistan measure the strength of US-Pak relations on the scale of US-India partnership.”

The commander went on to argue that while Pakistan could not afford to be in a “state of perpetual conflict with India” and has to “strike a balance between defence and development”, “we cannot afford to ignore our basic defence needs.”In sum, the comments on Afghanistan, India and the US suggest the Pakistan Army`s `India-centric` approach to strategic issues is still very much in place, with only minor adjustments made to accommodate the changed regional security environment in the 21st century.

In detailed comments on the military`s approach to North Waziristan Agency, the senior official said, “(The US) has an increased focus on North Waziristan for understandable reasons.”

But the official added there was serious domestic cause for concern, too: “Most terrorist attacks inside Pakistan originate from North Waziristan. So the question is not if but when and how to tackle it militarily.”

Nevertheless, citing three factors, the official downplayed the possibility of an imminent operation in NWA. First, the official said, South Waziristan needs to be resettled. Second, the country had to prepare for the `serious blowback` of an operation in NWA, which would include terrorist attacks in the cities and a fresh wave of Internally Displaced Persons.

Third, the official stressed the need for the “creation of a political consensus”. Referring to a similar consensus developed in the run-up to Operation Rah-i-Rast in Swat, the official suggested politicians, the media and the Pakistani public would have to demonstrate their support for a military operation in NWA before the army would undertake one.

When told of Prime Minister Gilani`s comment that there is no need for a fresh consensus because the support for the operation in South Waziristan also extends to North Waziristan, the official responded sharply: “I will not do it unless there is a political consensus on North Waziristan.”

In short, Kayani is going to change his views only when Pakistan's internal pressures cause him to do so. And this was made very clear last night during John Batchelor's discussion with Arif Rafiq, who routinely reports on the Pakistani view for John's audience. From John's summary of the discussion (it's the second interview on the 10 PM podcast):

Arif Rafiq, Pakistan Policy Blog, and Tom Joscelyn, Long War Journal, in re: Dawn is leaking WikiLeaks: [the Pakistani view is that] US policy is to strip Pakistan of nuclear capacity by producing controlled chaos. US three goals are to denuclearize, demilitarize, and de-Islamicize Pakistan.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is trying to delay important maneuvers until the clock runs out on the US in Afghanistan. Everybody is playing a double game: sponsoring jihadist attacks and ostensibly supporting the US. Complicated, multi-sided game. Emir of Qatar says, "The Iranians speak a hundred words; you can believe one" - this can be applied to all the players. Iran calls WikiLeaks documents all a U.S. plot.

Six NATO troops killed by Afghan police - at least the fifth time in 13 months that Afghan soldiers or police have turned their weapons on their NATO partners. Previous cases looked like Taliban infiltration.

But it was Tom Joscelyn who got off the best line. I don't have the exact quote, but he said in effect that the right approach for the United States in dealing with Pakistan is to learn to play it straight, to speak with complete frankness.

Tom is right. Playing it straight is the only way to communicate when you don't know how to bargain by rules that are thousands of years older than yours.